Identification of causes and analysis of techniques for reducing delinquent deliveries in Department of Defense production contracts by Dunbar, Glen Berry, III
IDENTIFICATION OF CAUSES AND ANALYSIS OF
TECHNIQUES FOR REDUCING DELINQUENT
DELIVERIES IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
PRODUCTION CONTRACTS





IDENTIFICATION OF CAUSES AND ANALYSIS
TECHNIQUES FOR REDUCING DELINQUENT





Glen Berry Dunbar III
December 1980
Thesis Advisor: D.V. Lamm









2. OOVT ACCESSION NO. » R(ClalCNT'| CATALOG NUMtEH
4 TITLE i'«r«d Suolltlo)
Identification of Causes and Analysis of
Techniques for Reducing Delinquent
Deliveries in Department of Defense
PrnHnnt.inn Hon -frr a r> t S
» TYRE O r REPORT * RERlOO COVERED
Master's Thesis
December 1980
• - RBRFORMINO OHG. MOOMT NUMIIR
7. AuTMOHni • CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER^*)
Glen Berry Dunbar III
» RCR'ORMINO ORGANIZATION NAME AND AOOREIS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^0
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT. TASK
AREA A WORK UNIT NUMBERS





IS- NUMBER OP RAGES
121
14 MONITORING AGENCY NAME A *00mCSt(ll tltltormnt In* Controlling Ollleo)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^0
IS. SECURITY CLASS, (ol into ra>erf)
Unclassified
ISa. DECLASSIFICATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCMEOULK
l«. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol into Hmmort)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT rat M»« atatracf wnloto* In Blast 20, II ttlloront trmm Kooort)
It SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES





20 kCT (Conttr •arr on* t*mntltt or Hoc* mmtmor)
Approximately one in four Department of Defense production
contracts are being carried in a delinquent status. These late
deliveries have a value of several billion dollars, and eighty
percent of the delinquent contracts are over ninety days late.
The impact of these late deliveries effects many military
organizations in a variety of ways. The causes of delinquency
stem from actions of the Government and of the contractor. The
DD | jaZ*7I 1473 EDITION O- I NOV «S IS OBSOLETE
(Page 1) S/H 0103-014- M0I : UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OW THIS •*OI (Whon Dmfo Bntorod)

UNCLASSIFIED
OeuMITV CLAUDICATION Of TM|$ P«OCrws«n O... Immtf
Government attempts to use a number of incentives to motivate
the contractor to provide timely delivery of the required
items. It also utilizes a variety of procedures in an
attempt to control and reduce the number of delinquent
contracts. Yet a significant portion of the contracts are
delinquent.
The objective of this research effort was to provide a
survey study of the delinquency problem, with a particular





S/N 0102-014-6601 c. sieu«i*v ciamipication or *•» PAoer**** o«»« »»(•<••<*)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Identification of Causes and Analysis of
Techniques for Reducing Delinquent
Deliveries in Department of Defense
Production Contracts
*y
Glen Berry Dunbar III
Captain, Signal Corps, United States Army
B.S., Business Administration, University of Illinois, 1971






Approximately one in four Department of Defense pro-
duction contracts are being carried in a delinquent status.
These late deliveries have a value of several billion
dollars, and eighty percent of the delinquent contracts
are over ninety days late. The impact of these late
deliveries effects many military organizations in a variety
of ways. The causes of delinquency stem from actions of
the Government and of the contractor. The Government
attempts to use a number of incentives to motivate the
contractor to provide timely delivery of the required items.
It also utilizes a variety of procedures in an attempt
to control and reduce the number of delinquent contracts.
Yet a significant portion of the contracts are delinquent.
The objective of this research effort was to provide
a survey study of the delinquency problem, with a particular
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Schedule performance of defense contractors has been
poor. Across the Department of Defense, approximately one
contract in four has not met its delivery schedule. Several
billion dollars of goods under contract have not been
delivered as specified under terms of the contract. Of
those deliveries over thirty days delinquent, eighty percent
were over ninety days delinquent. A multitude of factors
have contributed to these interesting statistics, however
the problem did not just recently develop, and may not be
resolved in the near future.
The problem of delinquent deliveries in Government
contracts has not been investigated from a systems approach.
Various studies have examined such questions as how to
measure the incidence of delinquency, how to monitor it,
and how to incentivize its reduction. The central issues
of causes, controls, impacts and costs have not been
addressed in a single study. The objective of this research
effort was to provide a survey study of the delinquency
problem, with a particular view toward stimulating further
in-depth research into its various aspects. To accomplish
this overall objective, the nature, extent and impact of
delinquency were examined. Its causes were identified,

and the current control procedures available to Government
acquisition and contracting personnel were evaluated for
effectiveness in reducing the incidence of delinquency
.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To provide a focus for the research effort, the follow-
ing primary research question was posed.
What are the causes of delinquent deliveries in
Department of Defense contracts, and how can the
incidence of delinquency be reduced or controlled?
From this basic question, three subsidiary questions
follow:
1. What is the nature and extent of the
delinquency problem?
2. What are the considerations in allowing or
disallowing schedule revision or slippage in
delivery requirements?
3. Can a model be developed to aid decision-
making in a delinquent delivery situation?
Answers to these questions have helped to define the
environment within which the problem of delinquent deliveries
exists. Once the operative forces have been examined and
the root causes identified, appropriate actions to reduce
the level of delinquency can be defined and evaluated.
C. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this research effort was limited to
Department of Defense (DoD) production contracts of less
8

than major system size. Production contracts were rela-
tively easy to identify as "being on time or delinquent
because of the specific nature of the item purchased.
Research and development contracts were somewhat more
nebulous with respect to the delivered product. Ease of
identification of hardware -oriented production contracts
led to that particular limitation. The procurement of
major systems is controlled by the Defense Acquisition
Regulations (DAR) and supplemental directives such as DoD
Directive 5000.1, "Major System Acquisitions," and Office
of Management and Budget (0MB) Circular A-109, "Major
System Acquisitions." Such systems have been extremely
complex and have involved many changes in contractual
requirements , including schedule changes. The intense
management of these systems has made the study of their
delivery performance somewhat less meaningful than that of
smaller production contracts.
Information has been gathered from many sources within
the DoD procurement community. Input was received from
the Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense Logistics Agency and
Defense Contract Administration Services. Some of the
information was strictly the opinion of the individuals
interviewed. Some of the data were derived from reports
issued by the various Services. It was understood by the
researcher that the reports, produced from the various
data bases, some of which are still being developed, imple-
mented and tested, were not precise. They were, however,

assumed to "be of sufficient accuracy to draw some general
observations . It was further assumed that, although access
to all data bases was not obtained, available information
was reasonably representative of the actual data of all
Services and Agencies.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Due to the non-empirical, perceptual nature of the
i
subject under study, the primary research methodology
chosen was the personal interview. The structure of the
interview was established via a series of questions
identified during the performance of the secondary research
methodology, an extensive review of available current
literature. Interview questions are presented in Appendix A,
A personal interview allowed for a free flow of ideas
and information. It assured thorough. understanding of the
intercommunication by allowing probing of fruitful ideas,
questioning and rephrasing of unclear responses, and
assimilation of the nuances and gestures of the interviewee.
These actions were not readily available using other
methodologies
.
The format of the interview was identical for all
sessions conducted. Following introductions, a brief
explanation and review of the research topic was presented
to the interviewee. Confidentiality of the source of
information was offered and provided upon request. Proper
name, grade, position and organization were verified.
10

A copy of the interview questions was provided to the
interviewee to facilitate understanding of the specific
questions and general flow of the discussion. To aid the
interviewer, a checklist of potential answers was prepared
and utilized where feasible. At the completion of the
question and response period, the formal interview was
closed. At this point, additional informal discussion was
held and data gathered as appropriate
.
All interview questions were pretested for completeness
and clarity. Pretest review, comments and suggestions were
obtained through the assistance of Major Jon D Trempor,
Captain Nancy Rosendale and First Lieutenant Dennis
Nordgaard all of the Resources Division of the Contracts
Branch of the Combat Developments Experimentation Command
at Ford Ord, California.
Interviewees were selected after discussions with the
various service and agency acquisition commands to deter-
mine which individuals in the organization were most know-
ledgable in the research topic. The names, titles and
positions of the interviewees are listed in Appendix B.
E. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In the accomplishment of the literature search,
resources of the Naval Postgraduate School library, the
Defense Documentation Center, the Defense Logistics
Studies Information Exchange and the Army Procurement
Research Office were utilized. In addition, reports were
obtained from the various Service commands and Agency
11

offices. Useful sources of information are listed in
the Reference and Bibliography sections at the end of
this paper.
F. KEY DEFINITIONS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
In order to facilitate presentation of the material, a
list of key definitions, abbreviations and acronyms has
"been compiled. This list is presented in Appendix C. Those
who are involved in DoD acquisition and contracting activi-
ties should "be familiar with the majority of the terms,
"but occasional reference to Appendix C may be helpful,
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Following this brief introduction, Chapter Two describes
the legal and regulatory framework within which the delin-
quency problem operates. The central issues of fault,
increased costs, schedule "buy- in" and incentive effective-
ness are examined and discussed. The real and perceived
impacts on the Department of Defense are assessed. Finally,
some recent developments are identified and discussed.
Chapter Three presents and analyzes the data obtained
from the interviewees. The estimated extent of the
delinquency problem is assessed. The causes of the problem
are identified and categorized. Considerations for further
action are addressed, and finally, the availability and
effectiveness of remedies and controls to reduce or
eliminate the problem are described.
12

Chapter Four summarizes the findings, draws conclusions






Within the "business environment, there exist the legal
and moral requirements to comply with the provisions of the
contract. Contractual compliance includes meeting the
specified delivery schedule. Failure to meet delivery
schedules can very easily result in default of the con-
tract and loss of future "business.
Federal acquisition personnel are governed by the
provisions of the Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR)
.
The DAR specifies the types of procurement actions which
must occur. It will be useful to examine selected excerpts
of the DAR applicable to the delinquency problem
.
Delinquency is defined by DAR as actual failure to
meet delivery schedule or potential failure to meet the
schedule due to failure to maintain adequate progress.*
/"8:25-101.3_7 This definition points out the two ways
that delinquency, and subsequently breach of contract, may
occur.
The DAR does recognize that some delays in contract
performance are not the fault of the contractor. These
delays are excusable and as defined by DAR: /~8: 7-203 .11_7
* References to the DAR will be annotated using the cited
paragraph in lieu of page number.
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. . . may include, "but are not restricted to: acts
of God or the public enemy; acts of the Government in
either its sovereign or contractual capacity; fires;
floods; epidemics; quarantine restrictions; strikes;
freight embargoes; and unusually severe weather.
Excusability of delay caused by subcontractor default
occurs if failure to make timely delivery "arises out of
causes beyond the control of both the Contractor and the
subcontractor, and without the fault or negligence of either
of them." /"8: 7-203. 11_7
Another section of DAR explains what is meant by acts
of the Government in its contractual capacity. If
schedule delay or disruption is caused by an act of the
Contracting Officer which is not within the provisions of
the contract, or his failure to take the required action
within a reasonable time, the contractor is not held res-
ponsible for the delay. If this happens, an equitable
adjustment in cost and schedule will be made in the con-
tract. /~8 : 7-104. 77 (f)_7
The status of contract performance is monitored through
production surveillance activities. This includes those
contract administration activities directed toward the
monitoring of progress toward contract completion.
£~Qt 25-101.1_7
A contractor in a delinquent status may be identified
through Government production surveillance, actual failure
to meet contractual delivery requirements, or surfacing of
a delinquent condition by the contractor . When a delinquent
15

condition is discovered, the contract must be modified or
terminated under default conditions
. A contract may be
terminated for default if the contractor fails to meet the
required delivery schedule or to make reasonable progress
toward its completion. /~8: 7-103 .11 (a)_7
Within this legal and regulatory framework defined as
well as it is, there are still several major issues having a
great impact on the Government's ability to manage the
delinquency problem.
B. ISSUES
During this research, four major issues surfaced
as being important in the examination of the delinquency
problem. The first is that of determining responsibility
for delays. In many cases, the Government is very involved
in administering the contract and may inadvertently direct
or cause a change in the activities of the contractor,
thereby causing or contributing to a delinquency. Unexcusable
delays in production, and therefore delinquencies, may be
due to the purposeful action or inadvertent error by either
the Government or contractor personnel. In many instances,
both parties are partially responsible for the delay. The
problem then becomes one of assessing the appropriate level
of fault to be assigned to each party, and the proper




The second issue is that of cost. Identifying the
applicable costs of a delinquency can be extremely complex.
Some costs are directly associated with the specific
contract; others are more remotely associated. Depending
on responsibility for the delinquency, the unit cost of
the items may increase or decrease. If the item under
contract is a component of a larger system, the system
costs may be increased due to the additional storage require-
ments and out-of-station installation. There are also
hidden costs which are nearly impossible to identify. Regard-
less of the type of contract, the additional overhead costs
due to the delay, but not covered by the instant contract,
will eventually be included in future contracts with both
Government and industry.
The third issue is unrealistic bidding in order to
remain responsive to the bid. The delivery schedule pro-
posed by the Government will be accepted by the contractor
whether the schedule is realistically possible or just a
figment of someone's imagination. As stated in DAR, "Any
bid which fails to conform to the delivery schedule or per-
missible alternates thereto stated in the invitation for
bids shall be rejected as nonresponsive . " /~8:2-404.2(c)_7
Regardless of the realism of the stated required delivery
date (RDD) set forth in the solicitation notice, the
contractor must accept it if his bid is to be considered
responsive. This is known as "buying- in" on the schedule.
/ll:13-l^_7 The Government procuring personnel generally
17

apply historical data to determine the production lead
time and RDD. During periods of high commercial demand
and increased lead times to acquire the necessary raw
materials, the stated RDD may "become impossible for the
contractor to meet. Yet, to be considered responsive,
he must bid based on the outdated RDD. /~15:79_7
The fourth issue of importance is that of motivation
or incentive to perform the contract within the specified
contractual provisions. Incentives and motivations
originate from within the contract as well as from within
the contractor. Theoretically, the proper incentives will
motivate a contractor to meet or exceed the contractual
requirements. Were this the case, delinquency would become
an insignificant problem.
Having identified the regulatory framework and major
issues involved, the extent of the delinquency problem
will now be examined.
C . EXTENT
At the time this research was conducted, it was
impossible to get an accurate indication of the extent
of the delinquency problem. Each data base was at a dif-
ferent level of development and treated report information
in a different manner. The United States Army Material
Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) uses the
Commodity Command Standard System (CCSS) and reports its
delinquencies by contract line item numbers (CLINS). The
18

Navy data "base and reporting system is still in early
development stages and as yet has no meaningful delinquency
data. The Air Force Automated Management Information
System (AMIS) is mostly completed, but the desired
delinquency data was not readily available. The Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) utilizes the Standard Automated
Materials Management System (SAMMS) and reports delinquen-
cies by CLINS. The Defense Contract Administration Services
(DCAS) currently reports delinquencies by contracts, but
soon plans to begin using SAMMS.
Not only are the reporting criteria different, the
reports themselves are different enough that accurate
comparison is at best general in nature . Timing is another
hinderence to accurate and comparable reporting. The delay
of entry into the reporting system caused by the flow of
paperwork varies among organizations. Actual delinquencies
may not be entered into the data base because of paperwork
delays. Conversely, some items listed as delinquencies
may have already been delivered, but the data has not
been expunged from the data base. Review and updating
of the information systems is a costly and time-consuming
process, and thus the systems are generally out of date.
Even with these problems, an examination of the
available reports gives an approximation of the extent
of the delinquency problem. The data presented below
were derived from reports available from the commands or
19

agencies listed. DARCOM data were derived from the
Production Surveillance Report of September 1979. DCAS
Management Area (DCASMA) Pasadena data came from the
Production Administration Delinquency Report (PADR) of
9 October 1979. DCAS Headquarters data came from the
Production Performance Data report of November 1979. DLA
data came from the Contract Delinquency Percentages
report of September 1979. Reports were not available
from the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) or the Naval
Material Command (NAVMAT)
.
Table 1. 1979 Delinquency Rates
Command/Agency Delinquency Rates
DARCOM * 26.2 %
DLA * 55-7 %
DCAS HQ ** 14.9 %
DCASMA Pasadena ** 23.5 %
* by CLINS
** by contracts
NOTE: Over 50% of DLA contracts were for
direct vendor delivery to the user. This
contract-type has experienced much higher
delinquency rates than other types.
From the data presented in Table 1, it would appear that
approximately 15-30$ of all contracts or line items are
in a delinquent status.
When the aging of delinquent contracts is examined, it
can be seen in Table 2 that the majority of such contracts
20

have "been delinquent for over ninety days. This basically
says that once a contract is in trouble, it tends to remain
in that status for some time. DARCOM further breaks out
delinquencies by thirty-day age-groups up to 420 days.
DARCOM reports that 32% of all delinquent deliveries are
over 420 days past due.
It is also interesting to note the dollar values of the
delinquent items as indicated in Table 3. Only DARCOM's
report listed the dollar values involved.
Table 2. 1979 Delinquency Rates by Age Groups
Command/ Affins by Percent
Agency 31-60 days 61-90 days over 90 days
DARCOM 8.9 8.1 83.0
DLA 32.8 19.2 48.0





**ad,justed for reporting differences
NOTE: Items are not listed as delinquent until
they are over thirty days past due to
account for paperwork delays
.
Table 3 . 1979 Delinquent Dollar Value
Delinquent Approximate Dollar Value








Based on the assumptions stated in Chapter 1,
reasonably accurate and representative data, an appreciation
for the extent of the delinquency problem can "be gained.
For DoD as a whole, it could "be stated that approximately
15-30% of all items under contract have not "been delivered
on time. These items have a dollar value of several
billion dollars. The delinquency of items under contract
causes significant problems not only for the procurement
personnel, but for the operating commands as well.
With the major issues identified and the extent of
the problem examined, the possible impact of delinquent
deliveries will now be explored.
D. IMPACT
The literature discusses the impact of delinquent
deliveries from two aspects, mission-oriented and cost-
oriented effects. Late delivery of parts or components
needed for maintenance of existing weapons systems or
operation of new systems can cause impaired effectiveness
of the system. For new items being fielded, a late
delivery of a component can delay introduction of the
item to field units; or the new items may be delivered
in an incomplete condition pending receipt of the
delinquent component. Weapons systems operating at less
than full capability can easily degrade the ability of
the unit to perform its full mission. /~7:D-2__7 This
reduced operational capability and unit readiness may
22

cause vital missions or training activities to "be delayed
or cancelled. £~h\\J In many units, incomplete or
inadequate equipment and training act directly to reduce
the level of unit "morale.
Delinquent deliveries of needed items also tend to
increase costs. If systems are being held pending receipt
of an item, additional storage and handling costs will be
incurred. If the system is fielded in an incomplete config-
uration, excess out-of-station installation costs are
incurred. Emergency corrective actions may be required
pending arrival of the delinquent items . Scheduled
operations or maintenance may have to be slipped. All
of these activities can lead to higher costs. Z~7:D-2_7
E. CAUSES
What are the root causes of delinquencies and why do
they occur?
The causes of delinquency identified in this section
use the literature as a baseline. No conclusions should
be drawn as to the completeness or order of importance of
the causes listed. As discussed earlier in this Chapter,
a delinquent situation may arise through fault of the
contractor, fault of the Government or through factors
not under the control of either party. The causes of
excusable delay have been previously listed, and non-
excusable delays are the real focus of this research.
Government personnel may cause a delay in production and
23

delivery by taking action or by failing to take action.
Changes in customer requirements, engineering change pro-
posals, design changes, progr-am changes and inadvertent
constructive changes can all cause delay and disruption,
and hence affect the delivery schedule. Changes by the
Government in the rate of work performed by the contractor
can also delay or disrupt the delivery schedule. These
changes include acceleration, stretchout, suspension of
work and issuance of a stop work order. /~3 :l6l-171_7
Delay or disruption of a production and delivery
schedule may also be caused by the failure of the Govern-
ment to act or failure to act in a timely manner. For
example, failure to inspect work in a timely manner,
approve drawings or make progress payments can all have a
major impact on contractor ability to meet delivery
schedules. /~"l6:553_7 Data packages provided by the
Government may be incomplete or simply impossible to per-
form. If Government furnished materials or equipment -
are provided, late or incomplete delivery of the equipment
or materials, or unservicability of equipment will have
a decided adverse impact on the contractor's ability to
meet the delivery requirements. /~13:30_J7
The contractor may also be at fault in a delinquency
situation. The causes may be internal to his organization
or external, but still under reasonable control. External
causes include such things as changes in production priorities
ZUr

requested or directed "by outside agencies, pro-duction
conflicts with prior commitments /~13:30__7, late receipt
of materials caused "by excess demand, and transportation
tie-ups or subcontractor default when the desired item or
service was available from other sources. /~l:4-37_7
Causes of delivery delays internal to a contractor's
organization are primarily centered around management
activities. Poor planning for production scheduling,
manpower needs, productive capacity, financial resources
and "backlog of orders can all delay timely delivery.
Misunderstanding of contractual requirements or unantici-
pated complexity of the manufactured item can cause
excessive delays. Poor quality control procedures which
cause extensive rework efforts can slow production rates.
Unnecessary labor problems caused by management can also
affect production timing. /~13:30_7 Basically all
contractor caused delivery delays are the result of poor
management, whether it be planning or controlling.
Since some of the causes have been identified, the
alternative controls or remedies should be examined to
find methods of reducing delinquencies.
F. CONTROLS AND REMEDIES
In the literature, there are a number of suggestions
regarding application of controls or remedies to reduce
the incidence of delinquencies. There are two phases of
of the contract where the roots of the delinquency problem
25

can occur, pre-award and post-award. Two types of con-
trols or remedial actions can occur. Controls which are
supportive in nature tend to reduce delinquencies by
encouraging on-time deliveries. Controls or remedies
that are punitive in nature tend to reduce delinquency
by discouraging late deliveries. Traditionally, negative
or punitive incentives have been applied to schedules.
In the pre-award phase of the contract, many actions
can be taken in order to attempt to reduce the possibility
of a delinquency. For raw materials or components having
low availability or long acquisition lead time /~17:252-253_7,
consideration can be given to requiring the contractor
to make the item rather than buying it through a sub-
contractor. /~12:B-2-76__7 If compliance with the delivery
schedule is vital, a multiple incentive clause can be
inserted in the contract to provide monetary incentive
to the contractor for meeting or exceeding the delivery
schedule. /~"l0:185_7 Appropriate consideration can also
be given to setting realistic delivery schedules for items
whose raw materials have long lead times.
An effective pre-award survey and conference can be
very useful in identifying potential problems and clarifying
those potential areas requiring interpretation. Free and
open communication is a key to the success of the survey
and conference in reducing the incidence of delinquency.
/""l3:30-32_7 As needed, the Government could give the
26

contract a high rating under the Defense Materials
System or the Defense Priorities System to speed acquisi-
tion of needed materials. /~13:33_7 In order to give
high Government attention to the administration of the
particular contract, a high level of production sur-
veillance category and criticality designator code can "be
assigned. /~13:34-_7 A careful review of potential con-
tractors' production schedules can be made, and special
attention can "be paid to the past performance record of
the contractor. /"~l4:7-8_7 The liquidated damages clause
can also be used to increase the attention of the con-
tractor on the importance of meeting the delivery schedule.
This requires that the extent of damages sustained due
to a delinquent delivery be determined prior to the
award of the contract and included in the clause. /~8:1-310_7
During the post-award phase of the contract, control
actions include open communication, retroactive assign-
ment of Defense Materials or Priorities System designators,
providing progress payments tied to delivery performance
and bilateral modification of the delivery rate within
the schedule to allow for steady rather than batch pro-
duction runs. /"5
:
50-52_7 increased production surveillance
may cause the contractor to apply greater attention to
the desired work effort, thereby reducing the possibility
of a delinquency. Once a delinquency has occurred, a
price adjustment may be negotiated to adjust for the
27

extended delivery schedule. The liquidated damages
clause will "begin to "be enforced. Finally, the various
steps of the termination for default procedures may be
applied. Use of the cure notice, show cause notice and
forbearance may be used to focus the attention of the
contractor on the desired results. The final step is
actual termination for default of the contract . /"~13:3^_7
Even with the use 'of these controls or remedies, there
must be some incentives to motivate the contractor to
reduce the incidence of delinquency.
G. INCENTIVES
Incentives for the contractor to perform within the
schedule requirements may be provided by the contract or
by forces outside of the contract. Extracontractual
incentives include good corporate and personal image or
reputation and follow-on business. /~2 : 2A10-2A11_7
Contractual incentives include profit, contract payment,
progress payments and schedule incentive provisions. Other
contractual incentives are included in the default and
liquidated damages clauses.
The Department of Defense noted in 1965 "that the
traditionally negative incentives of termination for
default, excess reprocurement costs charged to the con-
tractor and liquidated damages have had little positive
effect in reducing the incidence of delinquency. Z~~9:31_7
28

H. AN AGGRAVATING FACTOR
A situation which will have an increasing impact on the
delinquency rate is the rapidly increasing lead times for
some materials and components. As lead time increases,
the probability of not maintaining adequate support for
operating systems looms larger. /~6:2-3_7 As of February
of 1980, the lead times for forgings, castings, bearings,
machining capacity, semiconductors and metals such as 1
titanium, cobalt and chromium have increased dramatically.
Lead times for bearings and fasteners have increased to
thirty to ninety weeks; some forgings to over one hundred
weeks. In the last year, the lead time for integrated
circuits has more than doubled to a current delivery time
of twelve months. /~l8:80-83_7 As "the lead times expand
even faster, the incidence of delinquency is likely to
increase.
I . SUMMARY
Contractual agreements between Government agencies and
contractors are governed by DAR. This regulation care-
fully defines and describes delinquency, fault determin-
ation and resultant contract adjustments. This study of
the delinquency problem identified four major issues.
These are the issues of fault determination, incurrence of
increased costs, contractor acceptance of unrealistic
delivery requirements and effectiveness of incentives to
meet delivery schedules. Available data indicates an
29

overall delinquency rate of 15-30% and a dollar value of
delinquent items of over one-half "billion dollars in
one service alone. The impact of delinquent deliveries
is purported to "be far-reaching. A multitude of causes
of delinquency have "been identified, and a wide variety
of controls or remedies have been suggested to cope with
the problem. The effectiveness of contractual incentives
has "been questioned. The additional problem of rapidly
increasing lead times for required raw materials and
components serves only to aggravate the problem of
delinquency.
Chapter Three will present the results of this research
effort and an analysis of those results. Chapter Four will




III. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. METHODOLOGY
The open-ended nature of the questions precluded
pre-interview categorization of the potential responses.
After completion of the interviews, responses of the
individuals were examined for commonality across all
organizations. They were also examined for peculiarity
to a single organization or to buying commands as opposed
to headquarters commands . The "buying commands included
the Armament Materiel Readiness Command (ARRCOM) and the
Tank-Automotive Materiel Readiness Command (TARCOM).
The headquarters commands included DARCOM, NAVMAT, AFSC,
DLA and DCAS.
Where adequate information was available in the litera-
ture, comparisons were made with the data gathered from
the interviews for consistency. Where differences existed,
an attempt to identify the reasons for the difference was
made
.
To facilitate a clear presentation, discussion and
analysis of the interview data, responses to the questions
will be presented in order. Where meaningful, the response
data will be presented in graphical or tabular form.





During the interview period, seventeen individuals
from seven organizations provided responses to the ques-
tions. Of the seven organizations, five were headquarters
and two were "buying commands. The distribution of
























B. NATURE AND IMPACT OF THE DELIVERY DELINQUENCY PROBLEM
Question 1 - What is the estimated extent, in both
percentage and dollar terms, of delinquent deliveries of
goods in DoD production contracts?
The purpose of this question was to assess the aware-
ness of the extent of the delinquency problem., Where
reports were available, the interviewees referred to
the report; where unavailable, estimates were given. The


















The DARCOM reporting system was the only one listing dollar
values for delinquencies. ARRCOM and TARCOM are major
subordinate commands of DARCOM. When the AFSC interviewee
was questioned on the response of zero percent, the
reply was that as the delivery date approached and the
items were not on hand, the required delivery date was
moved back, therefore the items were not delinquent. The
NAVMAT response was an estimate based on the experience
of the interviewee. The responses of ARRCOM and TARCOM
are higher than that of DARCOM, but are consistent as the
DARCOM figure is a composite of five major subordinate
commands buying production items.
The responses obtained from the interviews are
consistent with the literature base as the same reports
were used. The estimate of NAVMAT is slightly higher
than the 15-30$ overall estimate presented in Chapter II,
but without an information system in operation the
estimate must be based solely on the experience of the
interviewee. The AFSC method of reducing the delinquency
rate to zero by continually changing the delivery date
seems to be a poor way to keep management attention
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focused on the problem. Elimination of the indication
of a problem, the delinquency rate, by redefining the
requirements does nothing toward solving the problem
.
It merely seems to cover the fact that a delinquency
problem exists.
From the responses to Question 1, it appears to the
researcher that awareness of the extent of the delinquency
problem is directly related to the operation of an infor-
mation reporting system. Of the reporting systems in
operation, only the DARCOM system provided information on
the dollar value of delinquent items.
Question 2 - What is your goal or standard for delin-
quent deliveries (in percentage or dollar terms)?
Question 3 - How was this goal or standard established?
Question 2 and 3 were an attempt to identify the
organizational standards for the incidence of delinquency
and the reasoning behind the goal. The responses will be
presented and analyzed together. All of the individuals
interviewed commented that the ideal goal for delinquency
rates was zero percent, but this goal was not realistically
attainable. Responses to Questions 2 and 3 were as follows:
Organization Goal How Established
DARCOM 15?o By consensus of management
NAVMAT None established
AFSC None established





ARRCOM 15% Set by DARCOM
TARCOM 15$ Set by DARCOM
*DLA has established separate goals for each of its




Defense personnel (medical) 54$
Defense general 52$
Defense industrial 5^f°
The DARCOM goal of 15$ was established by consensus
of management as to what constituted a realistic and
attainable level of delinquency. The ARRCOM and TARCOM
goals were passed down from headquarters to the major
subordinate commands. The goals established for the DLA
supply centers as ten percent less than the actual
delinquency rate of the previous year provide a dynamic
goal which changes with actual performance.
Goals should serve to motivate organizational person-
nel to strive toward the desired condition. A goal must
be attainable if it is to serve as a motivator. Goals
should also be reviewed periodically and revised if
necessary. The mere existence of a goal can indicate
some level of management interest; conversely, lack of




Question 4 - What do you perceive to be the impact of
delinquent deliveries to the Government, prime contractors
and subcontractors?
The individuals interviewed perceived no significant
impact on prime contractors or subcontractors . Responses
from the headquarters organizations perceived no impact
on prime and subcontractors; the two buying commands
perceived only minor impact in the form of possible loss
of profit on fixed-price contracts. The reasons for this
perception will become clear in these responses to
Questions 12 and 16. Discussion and analysis of these
responses will be integrated with the presentation of
responses to Questions 12 and 16.
Responses to the question of impact on the Government
centered around the three issues of unit readiness,








increased costs of items















less timely response to customer
needs 3 Headquarters
Responses to the readiness issue indicate to this
researcher that the functionally closer an organization
is to the ultimate user, the clearer will "be his percep-
tion of the user's problems . The "buying commands work
more closely with the user of the procured items than do
the headquarters elements . This makes the buying command
more sensitive to the impact of delinquency on the user.
Individuals from "both headquarters and "buying commands
perceive the increase in costs due to delinquency. In
cost-type contracts, delay in completing the required work
will increase costs of labor and overhead charged to
the contract. This would not directly increase costs
in fixed-priced contracts, however the Government will
pay for them in an indirect manner. Delay of work com-
pletion will not increase the price of the current fixed-
price- contract, but it will cause an increase in later
contracts. Fixed costs, general and administrative costs
and other overhead costs incurred during the delinquent
period of a contract will not be covered by that contract,
but will certainly be included in determining prices for
future contracts . These hidden costs will eventually be
paid for by the Government in the form of higher unit costs
of the item or others manufactured by that contractor.
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Some delinquent items may cause an increase in
storage costs pending arrival of a component. For example,
an artillery round which is complete except for a component
of the arming device may "be accepted "by the Government
pending arrival of the missing part. The incomplete
round will have to be stored and secured until such time
as it is completed. When the part for the arming device
arrives, it can "be installed in the round at the storage
location or at the assembly plant. Both of these options
will be more expensive than installation during initial
assembly of the round. If installation is made at other
than the original assembly site, additional off-site
installation costs will be incurred for the extra trans-
portation and labor costs.
The researcher noted that the types of costs cited by
the headquarters organizations are of a general nature
of interest to a higher level of management. The costs
mentioned by the buying commands are of an operational
nature. This variance of perception is a common organiza-
tional phenomenon.
The responses addressing customer service centered
around the customer service available from the limited
manpower resources of the procurement organization
.
Delinquencies require increased attention of procurement
personnel. This increased workload allows less time to
be spent on other requirements. Response time to new
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customer needs increases, and the overall level of cus-
tomer service decreases. The available manpower levels
do not respond rapidly to changes in workload. The
Government's seeming requirement of more and more output
from less and less resources holds equally true for pro-
curement organizations.
C. CAUSES OF DELIVERY DELINQUENCIES
Question 5 - What are the causes of delinquent deliveries
in both general and specific terms, within the classifi-
cations of Government caused, contractor caused and other?
(in order of importance)
The causes of delinquency described by the inter-
viewees were many and varied. The specific circumstances
of each individual delinquency is slightly different,
but are close enough to fit into the categories listed in
the following chart. Responses are divided between Govern-
ment caused and contractor caused; other causes were
not listed by the interviewees. The number of individuals
who mentioned each cause is listed under the type of
organization to which he belonged, headquarters or buying
command. The extent of each of these causes in contributing
to the overall level of delinquency was not investigated,
but the researcher infers the relative order of importance





Government caused Headquarters Buying cmd
Unrealistic RDD 6 8
Technical data packages incomplete
or out-of-date 2 5
Government furnished materials,
equipment or tooling late or
damaged 1 5
Changes in configuration, or
engineering change proposals 3 3
Delays in processing paperwork 4
Lack of adequate inspection or
acceptance criteria 2
Contractor caused
Late receipt of materials 4 8
Poor or over-optimistic planning for
production, capacity or "backlog 5 5
Poor management and lack of follow-up 3 5
Schedule "buy- in 3 5
Misunderstood contract 3
Economic factors 1
All of the individuals interviewed, except from DCAS
and NAVMAT, mentioned that unrealistic required delivery
dates on contracts was a major cause of delinquent
deliveries. Required delivery dates (RDD) are specified
"by the originator of the procurement action, the user.
This RDD is checked "by the "buying command for reasonable-
ness. If reasonable, the RDD is used on the contract;
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if unreasonable, the "buying command coordinates with the
requisitioner for possible modification of the RDD. The
"buying command does not unilaterally change the RDD
without permission of the user. The "buying command con-
sults past purchases of the same or similar items to
determine the reasonableness of the RDD. If the past
purchase was recent, the RDD may be attainable by the
contractor. If the lead time for availability of an item
has increased since the last purchase, the RDD may not be
reasonable. For example, the last purchase of a certain
item requiring integrated circuits was over a year previous
to the current requirement. Delivery time on that con-
tract was six months, therefore an RDD of eight months
was thought to be reasonable. Currently, the lead time
for contractor acquisition of the integrated circuits is
nearly twelve months. The contract will be carried as
delinquent until delivery of the item to the Government.
One individual stated that for new items or those not
purchased recently, he would occasionally make informal
telephone inquiries to contractors in order to determine
what current lead times are for specific items and what
.
a reasonable completion period would be. By using that
information in determining the delivery schedule for
the solicitation document, the possibility of a delinquency
is reduced. He also stated that with the current work-
load, this action could not be taken on all contracts.
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The researcher feels that the informal check is a viable
alternative in special cases. The literature pointed out
several items and components with increasing lead times.
These items and others discovered through experience could
he monitored and checked prior to issuance of the
solicitation.
Problems with technical data packages were mentioned
by seven of the interviewees as a cause of delinquency.
For noncommercially produced items, the Government often
maintains the technical data package for production of
the item. When such an item is purchased, the technical
data package is provided to the contractor. The original
producer of the item and preparer of the technical data
package may, for some reason, not have provided complete
information. Some symbols used in-house may be common
only to that company and would not be understood by
another firm. A mistake may have been made in the prepara-
tion of the data. If an item has been purchased over a
period of time, the manufacturing technology may have
changed. One of the individuals interviewed stated, "Tech-
nology advances, technical data packages don't." This
points out a potential problem with the use of technical
data packages. They must be maintained in an up-to-date,
complete condition if they are to be used efficiently
by contractors. A mistake or omission may cause a delay
in manufacturing until the deficiency is corrected. A
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change in technology may cause increased set-up time for
the contractor's production facilities to produce in
accordance with the technical data package.
An example of the effect of an incomplete data package
occurred during the procurement of a component for a
microwave radio . The original producer provided the
technical data package, out did not include information
of a proprietary nature. A subsequent procurement of the
item was awarded to another firm who was provided the
technical data package. Lacking the proprietary data, they
could not manufacture the item in a satisfactory manner.
The contract finally became delinquent and was terminated.
The reprocurement was then placed with the original firm
more than a year after the initial reprocurement attempt.
A large number of the multitude of items purchased by
the Government are strictly military in nature and are not
routinely produced in the commercial market. Many of
these items have technical data packages. The effort
required to check them all for completeness, accuracy and
and clarity is quite large. In addition, updating the
packages to be consistent with current technology advances
increases the already sizeable task. Manpower availability
within the procurement organizations appears to be
insufficient to accomplish this task in addition to their
other duties. Increased emphasis on buying commercially
produced items, as outlined in Office of Management and
Budget Circular A-76 entitled "Policies for Acquiring
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Commerical or Industrial Products and Services for
Government Use," may decrease the need for maintaining
the current quantity of technical data packages. This
will not, however, eliminate the need to continually
update the technical data packages.
Six of the individuals interviewed stated that a cause
of delinquent delivery is the delivery of Government fur-
nished materials, equipment or tooling after the agreed
upon date or in a damaged condition. This can occur when
a transportation problem prevents timely delivery, higher
priority delivery requirements cause a delay or an excess
of requirements over manpower resources create a backlog
of shipments to contractors . Equipment or tooling can be
accidently damaged during movement or storage. For example,
in the production of a component for an armored vehicle,
a special type of tooling was needed by a contractor.
Although the shipment was delivered on time, the tooling
had been damaged in transit. Replacement of the tooling
took several months; consequently, the contract was
delinquent by several months.
Late or damaged Government furnished material, equip-
ment or tooling is discussed in the literature base and
has been included in the four most-mentioned Government
caused reasons for delinquency. It seems to the researcher
that this problem should be readily solved by the appli-
cation of sound logistical management of the Government
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furnished items. The reason for this deficiency was not
explored by the researcher, nor was the in-depth study
of the reason within the scope of this study.
Changes in the requirements during production can cause
a delay in completion of the items. Six of the individuals
interviewed stated that engineering change proposals (ECP)
or configuration changes of components can cause delinquent
situations. ECP's may "be proposed by the Government or by
the contractor. Once they are approved and directed, the
contractor must make the appropriate changes in the pro-
duction operation or in the plans. Either action will take
time to implement. A change may speed production, slow
it down, or have no effect on it. Where any delay is
imposed on the contractor's production schedule, the
potential for a delinquency exists.
Changes in the configuration of a component can cause
the same types of delay. These changes are usually directed
in support of changes to a major system. Eliminating
changes to systems or components could certainly reduce
the incidence of delinquency, but it would also limit the
flexibility to adjust the requirements to meet changing
needs. A conscientious effort to fully define the require-
ments and thus minimize changes would cause less delay
in the production process.
The literature discussed ECP's and configuration changes
as causes of delinquencies; the research has indicated
45

that it is one of the four most-mentioned reasons. To
maintain flexibility in defining requirements and to allow
for changes to improve the effectiveness or efficiency of
the item being produced, changes are necessary. At the
same time, control over the changes is also necessary.
The fifth reason for Government caused delay is that
of administrative delay, and was mentioned by four of the
interviewees. The delays involved in timely processing
i
of paperwork may come from many sources. Approval of plans
and drawings may be delayed by a high level of workload
at the contract administration office. Late issuance of
progress payments to the contractor could delay his acqui-
sition of needed raw materials, thereby delaying completion
of the contract. Where approval of the use of subcontractors
is required by the Government, an unreasonable delay in
granting or denying that approval can delay the acquisi-
tion of needed items.
For example, one individual cited a contractor that was
delayed two months pending approval of a minor electrical
wiring change which would increase the effectiveness of the
item. Each time he inquired as to the status of the change,
he was told it would oe forthcoming soon. As it turned out,
the engineer who was supposed to approve the change had




Although this cause of delay was mentioned only lightly
"by the available literature "base, the researcher feels that
it is an important factor. As the paper documentation for
all contract actions "becomes increasingly important, the
total mass of documentation handled "by a procurement agency
increases tremendously. Without similar increases in man-
power resources, the individual workload increases. Any
disruption in the processing of the paperwork can easily
i
cause an increase in the "backlog of required actions, and
thereby cause some delay in completion of some contracts.
Two of the individuals mentioned that a lack of adequate
inspection and acceptance criteria for some new items has
caused some contracts to be delinquent. Although this has
occurred in only isolated cases, it may be indicative of
a potentially larger problem. For example, as a newly
developed electronic component reached completion and was
ready for inspection by Government personnel, the inspector
had not been provided guidance as to the required inspec-
tion criteria. While the request for this information went
to the appropriate department for development of criteria,
the contract moved into a delinquent status. Adequate
preparation of the criteria before completion of the
contract would have eliminated this delay.
The literature base did not discuss this type of delay
as a cause of delinquency. It is unknown by the researcher
if this is a recent development or an isolated incident that





Not all delinquencies are caused by the Government;
some are caused "by the contractor, others "by factors
"beyond the control of either party. Twelve of the indivi-
duals interviewed stated that late receipt "by the con-
tractor of raw materials and components is a major cause
of delinquencies. This late receipt of materials from
vendors or subcontractors may result from several circum-
stances. Extended lead times for some items may be due to
a high level of commercial demand for the item, non- availability
of a regular supply for the material, or lack of industrial
capacity to meet the demand. A change in delivery priority
by a vendor can also cause the required materials to be
late
.
For example, one interviewee described a delinquency
by a small business as being caused by a vendor change in
delivery priority. The small contractor provided only a
small percentage of the total business of a large foundry.
While his order was awaiting completion, a large customer
of the foundry requested urgent delivery of a special order.
The foundry changed the priority of the orders to accommo-
date the larger customer. The small business received his
castings well after the originally promised date and was
consequently unable to complete the Government contract on
time. His contract went into a delinquent status. As the
interviewee stated, "Sometimes the little guys don't have




In addition to the reasons for late receipt of materials
listed by the interviewees , the available literature also
mentioned transportation tie-ups, production disruptions
and severe reductions in availability of raw materials.
The researcher feels that a multitude of reasons exist
for causing late deliveries of materials. Some are
directly responsible for the delay; some are very indirectly
responsible. But any unanticipated delays in receiving
required materials can certainly have a direct impact
on a contractor's ability to complete the contract on
schedule
.
Ten of the seventeen individuals interviewed listed
poor or overoptimistic planning by the contractor as a major
cause of delinquencies. Three specific types of planning
were mentioned as being unrealistic. First, production plan-
ning is occasionally poor in that the anticipated ease
and efficiency of manufacturing an item fails to materialize
when the planned production process is actually implemented.
Second, planned productive capacity of the contractor's
organization often cannot be realized due to unexpected
inefficiencies or maintenance problems. Third, the backlog
of orders accepted by the contractor in order to maintain
a steady flow of work and revenues periodically gets larger
than what can be reasonably produced and delivered in a
timely manner.
For example, a contractor for repair parts on an
armored vehicle accepted a large contract based on what
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turned out to "be an overly optimistic estimate of main-
tenance downtime of his machinery. During production of
the contract, the machine downtime far exceeded the
original estimate. Insufficient slacktime was allowed to
account for the downtime and the contract went into a
delinquent status.
The literature "base also mentioned poor planning for
availability of financial and manpower resources. From
the interview data, the researcher would infer that these
do not presently cause significant problems. Adequate avail-
ability of financial resources can become difficult to
obtain during periods of high interest rates or tight
credit controls. Manpower availability is very dependent
on the local economic situation in the contractor's area.
Unless plans for production, capacity and backlog
are widely divergent from normal historical levels, over-
optimism can be very difficult to identify and document.
Poor planning can be caused by lack of experience and
deficiencies can often be spotted and corrected very early
in the production cycle.
The third major reason for contractor-caused delinquency
is simple poor management and lack of follow-up of ongoing
activities. Eight of the seventeen interviewees listed
this as a major reason. This is a somewhat general comment,
but is used to specify management of operational activities
of the firm and exclude the planning function. For example,
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one command was checking the status of a delinquent con-
tract. The contractor stated that he had not yet received
his raw materials from the vendor. In checking with the
vendor, the Government found that the materials had been
shipped six months previously. Further inquiry found that
the contractor's receiving department had received the
materials six months previously, but had failed to report
the receipt. The contractor failed to follow-up on the
perceived late delivery by checking with the vendor. Con-
sequently, his delivery to the Government was delinquent
due to poor management by the contractor.
There are a multitude of variations of poor management.
Throughout the production process, from purchase of raw
materials to shipment of the finished goods, many opportun-
ities exist for poor management to cause delays in production.
The duty of Government acquisition personnel is to manage
contracts, not to manage contractors. While poor manage-
ment by the contractor is not an excuse for delinquencies,
it is certainly one of the causes of delinquent contracts.
Schedule buy-in, as described in Chapter II, occurs
when a contractor responds to a solicitation and claims
that he can meet the required delivery schedule, even
though he knows it is unreasonable. Once he has been
awarded the contract, he will attempt to get a schedule
extension or allow it to be declared delinquent and hope
the contract will not be terminated. Eight of the individuals
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interviewed listed schedule buy-in as a cause of delinquency.
Schedule "buy-in is difficult to identify because of the
question of intent. If the contractor realistically
believed that he could meet the delivery schedule and it
was his intent to do so, then buy- in did not occur. If on
the other hand, the contractor knew he could not meet the
delivery schedule, but bid in a responsive manner with
the intent of getting schedule extensions or being in a
delinquent status, then a buy-in has occurred
,
Schedule buy- in is closely associated with the problem
of unrealistic RDD's quoted by the Government. In order
to remain eligible to receive the contract, a contractor's
bid must be responsive to the solicitation. If an
unrealistic RDD is incorporated in the solicitation, in
order to get the contract, the contractor feels he must
buy- in. It appears to the researcher that the first
problem drives the second one. If that is true, a reduc-
tion in the Government's use of unrealistic RDD's could
lead to a reduction in the incidence of schedule buy-ins
by the contractors
.
The fifth contractor-caused reason for delinquencies
was identified by three of the interviewees. That reason
is a simply misunderstood contract. This occurs when the
contractor bids on and is awarded a contract that he has
failed to completely understand or analyze . The extra
time involved in restudying the requirements and replanning
their accomplishment can directly lead to a delinquent
52

situation. For example, one contractor was awarded a
contract requiring the performance of a milling operation
„
Although the contractor had mills, he had not taken the
size of the item into account . The item to "be milled was
too large for his machines and he had to subcontract the
milling operation. The time involved in finding a sub-
contractor who had the capabilities needed and getting
the work scheduled and accomplished drove the contract
several months into delinquency. The misunderstanding of
the requirements of the contract directly resulted in a
delinquency.
The literature base identified this problem, but
did not discuss it in depth, nor was it identified as a
particularly major cause of delinquency. The three
individuals who identified this cause were from the same
organization. They may well have recently experienced
the case described above, and so mentioned it during the
interview.
The final cause of delinquencies related to actions
of the contractor is that of economic factors operative
in the business environment . Only one individual men-
tioned economic factors, and it is a rather broad statement
and can encompass many things. The specific aspects of
economic factors addressed here are the effects of rising
interest rates and inflation. Rising interest rates
drive up the cost of maintaining large on-shelf inventories
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at all levels. Lower inventories can lead to a lower
ready availability of materials and components, which
in turn means longer lead times. This can lead directly
to a delinquency situation.
Another effect of inflation "becomes evident in one
example described in an interview. A contractor who had
"been awarded a contract approached the Government with the
request to have the contract terminated. Between the time
the "bids were submitted and the time of contract award,
inflationary pressures had increased the cost of the
needed raw materials to a level where the contractor would
be in a position of possible bankruptcy. The contract was
terminated and reprocurement action was initiated. Had
the contractor waited until the contract was delinquent
to request termination, Government acquisition of the
required item would have been delayed even longer.
Although not addressed by current literature, the
researcher feels that economic factors of rising interest
rates and inflation will begin to have greater impact on
the incidence of delinquencies. Rising interest rates
should make expansion and investment more difficult for
smaller contractors . Tightening credit could make it
more difficult to obtain financing for normal operations
and special production projects. This could in turn cause
an increase in the incidence of delinquencies.
5^

Although it does not show up in the chart of responses
listed earlier, the researcher noted an interesting and
perhaps significant phenomenon. None of the individuals
from the service commands (DARCOM, NAVMAT and AFSC) men-
tioned contractor-caused problems as reasons for delinquen-
cies. Their "basic daily routine is that of managing the
Government acquisition organizations. This does not include
close contact with contractors. The researcher feels
that "because of their orientation toward the Government
"buying organizations, the level of perception of contractor-
caused problems is lessened. All of the individuals who
mentioned causes of delinquency occasioned "by the contractor
were from organizations having greater day-to-day contact
with the contractors. These individuals (from DLA, DCAS,
ARRCOM and TARCOM) seem more attuned to the interplay of
Government-contractor activities. From these observations,
the researcher infers that an individual's organizational
position and duties have a great influence on an individual's
perception of the problem.
D. ' DELIVERY DELINQUENCIES AS A FUNCTION OF CONTRACT TYPE,
COMMODITY AND CONTRACTOR
Question 6 - Is there any particular contract type
that has been experiencing delinquency problems?
The responses to this question were varied and included
some qualifications. The responses varied from fixed-price
contracts experiencing higher delinquency rates to lower




Response Frequency of Response
no difference 10
fixed-price competitive —higher 5
fixed-price —lower 2
direct vendor deliveries —higher 3
first production contracts —higher 2
Of the seventeen individuals responding to the question,
ten perceived no difference in delinquency rates between
various types of contracts. A typical response from these
individuals was, "No, there's no difference as far as
delinquencies are concerned."
Five of the individuals interviewed stated that compe-
titively placed fixed-price contracts experienced a higher
rate of delinquency than other types of contracts. In
competitive contracts, the Government specifies the delivery
requirements, and the contractor must respond accordingly
if his Did is to be responsive. Noncompetitive contracts
allow for negotiation of the contract provisions, therefore
the contractor has some input to and influence over the
delivery requirements. Because of this, the individuals
stated, competitive fixed-price contracts have a higher
incidence of delinquency.
Two individuals stated that fixed-price contracts
generally have lower rates of delinquency than other con-
tract types. They said that the majority of fixed-price
contracts are for items of known and well-established
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production technologies. For this reason, fixed-price con-
tracts have lower delinquency rates
.
DLA interviewees noted that although they perceived
no difference "between contract types, those contracts con-
taining provisions requiring the contractor to deliver
the items directly to the using unit have a higher incidence
of delinquency. They stated that this occurs for two reasons.
First, the contractors are not fully aware of the various
shipping times and methods for assuring on-time delivery
to the many wide spread units to whom the items go. Second,
if the contractor has a problem delivering the items on
time, feedback from the Government procurement organiza-
tions will not "be as immediate for delinquent deliveries
to using units. The feedback delay occurs because the using
units must report the delinquency through their chain of
command to the procuring agency for action. By the time
the Government agency reacts, the contractor hopes to have
already shipped the delinquent items.
The interviewees from DARCOM felt that fixed-price
contracts generally experienced lower delinquency rates, but
stated that contracts for first production runs experienced
a higher delinquency rate. This is due to delays occurring
during set up and correcting deficiencies in the initial
productive processes.
This question has not been addressed in the available
literature. It appears to the researcher that delinquency
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rates are not significantly different "between contract types.
Certain circumstances exist which tend to "be associated
with the higher delinquency rates, hut these are not a
function of the type of contract. They appear to he a function
of conditions outside the contract itself.
Question 7 - Is there any specific type or classification
of equipment that has "been experiencing delinquency problems?
The responses to this question were very much in line
with the items listed in the current literature base.
The responses listed "below are counted "by organization
rather than "by individual. The researcher assumed that all
individuals of the organization would perceive the same
answer. This will eliminate any "bias introduced into the
results "by a varying number of interviewees per organization.



























The items which are most involved in delinquency situa-
tions are the same types of items having long lead times
for commercial industry as well as for items under defense
contracts. The extended lead times derive from excess demand
in the commercial market and a shortage of manufacturing
capacity or raw materials to meet that demand. These lead
times are a function of economic supply and demand and
are not readily controllable "by either party to a contract.
Question 8 - Is there any specific class of contractor,
large, medium, small, minority, etc., that has been
experiencing delinquency problems?
The responses to this question were fairly clear-cut.
The responses have been categorized by type of contractor,
and the number of responses are given by organization.
Four organizations (DARCOM, NAVMAT, AFSC and DCAS) reported
no differences between types of organization for the incidence
of delinquency. The other three organizations (DLA, ARRCOM
and TARCOM) all provided identical responses and reasons.
They stated that small and minority businesses are involved
in a higher percentage of delinquencies than other sizes
of businesses . Individuals from those three organizations
attribute this to an overall lower level of experience,
management capability and capital availability.
Although not addressed in the current literature, it
seems logical to the researcher that small businesses would
have a greater problem of meeting delivery schedules. Many
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small and minority "businesses are relatively new in the
"business world. The experience level of managers may "be
less than that of larger companies . They may not have
the available capital or credit needed to accomplish
a new job. This is not to say that all small or minority
businesses are in this situation, but certainly a higher
percentage of them than of larger well-established firms.
E. PREDICTING DELIVERY DELINQUENCIES
Question 9 - What methods are used, or what signals
looked for, to predict or evaluate the possibility of
delinquent deliveries?
The responses to this question are listed below. The
number of responses are reported by individual. The items
listed may occur during the pre-award or post-award phase
of the contract; the phase is indicated after the response.
No major difference in responses was noted between head-






























other contracts Pre- award 2 Sf°
Size/degree of
Government "bus-
iness Pre-award 2 5$
Purchased parts
problems on other
contracts Pre-award 1 3$
The percentage of total responses listed above indicates
that the most important indicators of possible delinquencies
are the pre-award survey and past performance. The pre-
award survey involves an evaluation of the ability of
the contractor to perform in a satisfactory manner. The
purchasing office indicates which particular areas it
wants the contract administration office to investigate
and evaluate. DD Form 152^ is used to request the survey
and report the results. Factors to be investigated include
such items as technical, production and financial capability,
plant, facilities, equipment, labor resources, performance
record and ability to meet required schedule. If delivery
dates are critical, the factor of ability to meet required
schedule is very important
.
Even though the contractor's performance record is
included in the pre-award survey, 22$ of the responses
listed past performance separately. These individuals
indicated that additional attention should be placed on
the past performance of the contractor in meeting delivery
requirements. They noted that particular attention should
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be given to past performance on delivery of the specific
items or similar items involved in the instant contract.
One of the interviewees commented, "Past performance on
specific items and items in general, when combined with the
results of the pre-award survey, provides the "best indication
of probable contractor performance."
Current delivery performance on other contracts with
the Government and with private industry can provide a
current indication of timely contract completion. This
information can be obtained from the contractor or from
production surveillance personnel involved with other con-
tracts in the contractor's facilities. Progress on the
instant contract can be monitored and reported on by these
same production surveillance personnel during the post-award
phase of the contract.
Three of the interviewees felt that the answers and
behavior of contractor personnel during the post-award
conference provided an indication of probable delivery per-
formance. If the contractor was aware of all aspects of
the contract and the production plans, the probability of
a delinquency was considered to be low. If the contractor
seemed to not fully understand the requirements and was
vague about production plans, the possibility of a delinquency
increased.
Two of the interviewees felt that material reject rates
of similar contracts provide an indication of the quality
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control exerted "by the contractor over his production.
A high reject rate can show poor quality control and
indicate that possible high rework efforts are required.
This may cause a contract to be delivered late.
The size or degree of a contractor's involvement with
Government "business can have an effect on the priority given
to completion of a contract. When a substantial portion of
total sales "by the contractor are made to the Government,
a greater level of management attention will be given to
fulfilling contract requirements. Where the Government is
only a minor customer, production priority on its contract
may "be low, and the possibility of a delinquency increases.
One of the individuals interviewed indicated that he
looks for problems with contractor purchased parts as an
indicator of possible delinquency. If control over his
purchased parts and influence over his vendors is poor,
he may have problems obtaining or maintaining control over
his raw materials and components „ This could lead directly
to late completion of the contract and subsequent late
delivery of the items . An example of this was cited
earlier when the contractor failed to follow up on his
parts orders and lost control of the items in his receiving
department.
Although some of the individuals interviewed had
developed particular indicators of delinquency, undoubtedly
based on their personal experience, the pre-award survey
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and past performance were the primary indicators. These
two items combine actual performance data with current
estimates and evaluations of contractor capabilities to
give a clear indication of the possibility of a delinquent
situation arising during performance of the instant
contract.
F. SCHEDULE MODIFICATIONS
Question 10 - When it becomes apparent that the required
delivery will not be made on schedule, what considerations
are given to allowing the schedule to change as opposed
to terminating the contract? Why?
Question 11 - Same question as above, but to disallow-
ing a schedule change? Why?
Question 10 and 11 were designed to probe the considera-
tions for and against schedule changes when a delinquent
situation develops. As the interviewing progressed, it
became obvious to the researcher that the two questions
were identical in nature, merely opposite in direction.
The- answers to the two questions were identical in form,
but varied in degree. As such, the responses, discussion




Response Frequency of Response
Degree of Government fault 5
Urgency of need 4
Sole source 3
Best interest of Government 3
Proprietary item/data 1
Possible loss of fiscal year money 1
The degree of Government fault in causing any production
delays was indicated as an important consideration in
allowing or disallowing a change in delivery requirements.
If the Government was not involved in causing a delay,
and all factors involved in the delay were under control
of the contractor, the delivery schedule should not be
changed. If, however, the Government was partially or
totally at fault for the delay, the schedule requirements
should "be modified to compensate for the extent of the
delay caused by the Government. Any delay resulting from
actions or inactions of the Government acting in its
contractual capacity, as described in DAR 7-104. 77(f),
is excusable and adjustments in the delivery schedule or
other consideration can be made. This response is drawn
directly from the DAR and has been supported by discussions
in the literature base.
The responses of urgency of need for the item and
consideration of the best interests of the Government are
often tied closely together. If an item is urgently needed
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"by the requesting agency, it may be in the best interest
of the Government to extend the delivery schedule rather
than terminate the contractor for default. For example,
an item which has just "become delinquent may "be finished
by the contractor in a month. If the estimated time to
terminate this contract and reprocure the item is three
to four months, the best interests of the Government may
be served by extending the delivery schedule in lieu
of termination. Conversely, if the contractor shows no
indication of completing the contract within a reasonable
time period, the best interests of the Government may be
served by disallowing a schedule change, terminating for
default and reprocuring the item. All aspects of the
situation must be considered in making such a decision.
Whether an item is manufactured by a sole source or
using a proprietary item or data may have a direct impact
on the decision to allow or disallow schedule change.
These two responses were quite similar in nature and can be
examined concurrently. In either situation, the Government
has but one contractor from whom to purchase the item,
at least in the near term. In a longer time span, it is
possible to develop a second source for the item, but
this consideration would not directly effect the action taken
on the current contract. When only one contractor makes
the needed item, default proceedings can often be a useless
exercise in that if the item is still needed, the Government
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will "be forced to deal with that same contractor again.
Action taken in these situations is not discussed in the
DAR or other "applicable regulations and must "be made by
applying sound "business judgment.
The last response, the possible loss of fiscal year
money, applies more to delinquencies near the end of the
fiscal year than to those occurring at other times. Funds
not obligated "by the end of the appropriation period are
lost to the procuring agency and revert to the U.S. Treasury.
For delinquencies occurring near the end of a fiscal year,
termination of a contract could result in the loss of use
of those funds if they could not be reobligated in the
proper time period. For these financial reasons, the
procuring agency may prefer to extend the delivery schedule
or take no action toward default proceedings in order to
preserve the use of those funds by the agency. The
researcher understands the desire of the agencies to
gain maximum use of all available funds and the aversion
to losing funds at the end of a fiscal year, but feels
that such action may suboptimize the overall acquisition
effort by, in effect, condoning delinquencies by the
contractor.
The decision to allow or disallow schedule changes
when a delinquency occurs is very dependent on the facts
of the particular situation. When this particular decision
point arises, the Contracting Officer must examine those
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factors listed above, and any others that may be pertinent,
and apply his sound business judgment to arrive at the
appropriate decision
.
Question 12 - If a schedule change is allowed, what
damages are assessed or adjustments in consideration are
made in the contract provisions?
Question 13 - How and when are they determined?
Question 12 and 13 are discussed together since they
are really different aspects of the same issue. The
responses from all persons interviewed were virtually
identical. In response to a change in delivery schedule,
some adjustment was made in the price paid, quantities
delivered or other contractual provision; a change in the
price paid is the dominant adjustment. The adjustment in
consideration is made at the time of the modification to
the contract and is made by the contracting officer or his
authorized representative. The type and amount of adjust-
ment is negotiated between the contractor and a Government
representative
.
The interviewees also agreed that the amount of
adjustment in consideration has been ineffective in reducing
the incidence of delinquency. A typical comment was,
"The usual adjustment is $25 to $100; that's just a
chicken-feed amount." The description of the adjustment
as "chicken-feed" was in relation to the total value
of the contract. On most contracts, an adjustment of $25
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to $100 is a mere fraction of one percent of the contract.
Such a small amount would not particularly concern the
contractor, and would not provide sufficient incentive
to correct future delinquency situations.
The available literature did not address the question
of adjustment in consideration. The researcher believes
that if adjustments in consideration are to he used to
discourage delinquencies, they must he of sufficient
magnitude as to convince the contractor to take sufficient
action to reduce or eliminate future delinquencies. The
size and type of adjustment must he determined by taking
into account all aspects of a particular situation before
arriving at a decision.
G. TERMINATION FOR DEFAULT
Question 14 - In delinquency situations, how often has
termination for default been seriously considered?
Question 15 - How often was it actually used?
Question 16 - When termination for default was considered
and rejected, why was it rejected?
Question 14, 15, and 16 were posed to examine several
aspects of the use of termination for default and its
probable impact on reducing the incidence of delinquency.
As the responses to the three questions relate to each
other, the data and analysis will be presented together.
There was no significant difference in responses between
headquarters and buying command personnel. The response
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from DCAS is not included "because it was found that DCAS
is rarely involved in the decision-making or implementa-
tion of termination for default. The response data
is presented "by command or agency. The abbreviated



































As noted in the responses, termination for default
has not "been a serious consideration in the majority of
delinquency situations. The actual usage of the termina-
tion procedures has "been negligible. Although the reasons
for its non-use are varied, need for the item "by the
Government was mentioned "by individuals of four of the
seven organizations. Regardless of the legal and regula-
tory proprieties of terminating the contract under default
conditions, the Government's need for the item will not "be
fulfilled "by doing so. In obtaining items from a sole
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source, or items with long acquisition or production lead
times, the reasonable probability of obtaining the needed
item by other means in an expeditious manner is remote.
In these cases, the need can often be fulfilled in a more
timely manner by allowing the delinquent contract to remain
in force.
Where some level of fault for the delay is assignable
to the Government, any action taken to terminate the con-
tract may give the contractor recourse against the Govern-
ment through the disputes procedures . This may be costly
and time-consuming to the Government agency involved. The
possible loss of fiscal year money was discussed under
Questions 10 and 11.
Several of the individuals interviewed felt that the
legal and regulatory procedures for terminating a con-
tract under default conditions were too cumbersome to
be effectively employed against delinquencies. One
individual stated that two of the termination proceedings
he was involved in had been in process for over a year.
With limited time and manpower available to the Government
procurement offices, the effort necessary to terminate a
contract is often not worth the gain to the Government
in terminating the contract. All of the above stated
reasons for not terminating for default are part of the
concept of best interest of the Government.
It appears to the researcher that termination of a
delinquent contract for default has little value in
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decreasing the level of delinquencies. The very small
percentage of actual terminations provides little incentive
to the contractor to decrease delinquencies. An intensified
effort to impose termination proceedures where appropriate
should have the effect of decreasing the incidence of
delinquency.
H. CONTROLLING DELIVERY DELINQUENCIES
j
Question 17 - What are the established procedures to
control or reduce delinquent deliveries, in both pre-award
and post-award phases of the contract?
Question 18 - How well do they work?
Question 19 - Why are they used?
Question 20 - Who is involved with them, and to what
extent?
Questions 17 through 20 are sufficiently similar' in
nature to warrant discussing and analyzing them together.
Actions taken to reduce the incidence of delinquency may
occur during both the pre-award and post-award phases 'of
the contract. As the point of award of the contract is
the point of Government and contractor commitment to the
contract, this is a logical point to divide the types
of action. Actions taken prior to award to reduce the
probability of delinquency are preventive in nature, while
actions taken after award are remedial in nature. Both
preventive and remedial actions can be considered as
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controls, and can serve to reduce delinquencies. The
logical separation of these kinds of control actions is
at the point of contract award. The response data to the
questions will "be presented in that format. The responses
are as follows
:
Pre- award Actions Responses
Effective pre-award survey 3
Use of greater technical expertise during
pre-award conference 1
Open communication 1
Performance "bonding (used mainly in
construction) 1
Special consideration for extended
lead time materials/components 1






Cure notice/show cause notice/
forebearance 1
Use of DCAS expediter 1
Escalating letters of concern 1
Technical assistance to the contractor 1
Expedite waivers/deviations 1
Provide assistance in getting parts/
materials 1
No legitimate way 1
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The responses to Questions 18, 19 and 20 were unanimous
and will be presented and analyzed after discussion of the
responses listed above.
Three of the individuals interviewed stated that the
information gained during an effective pre-award survey-
was instrumental in detecting, and thereby reducing, the
chance of a delinquency. When a pre-award survey indicates
a circumstance associated with a delinquency, the circum-
stance may be examined more closely and discussed with the
contractor for possible resolution. In formally advertised
solicitations, the indication of a possible delinquency
could be used as grounds to declare the contractor nonres-
ponsible, if such indication was strong enough. When
contractor adherence to the schedule is considered important,
the contracting officer must notify the persons performing
the pre-award survey of that importance and request that
certain elements of the survey be examined in greater than
normal depth.
One individual suggested the use of a greater amount
of technical expertise during the pre-award conference
in order to more adequately assure complete understanding
of the contract requirements by the contractor. In this
way, delays in production due to misunderstanding- of require-
ments would be reduced.
One individual stated that open communication with the
contractor personnel would reduce the occurrence of
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delinquency. Fostering open and free communication would
promote "better understanding of requirements and perhaps
promote greater cooperation toward timely contract com-
pletion.
Although performance bonds are normally required only
for construction contracts, one interviewee suggested
that their use on time-sensitive contracts would tend to
reduce the incidence of delinquency. The bonds would
serve to increase the attention of the contractor on the
importance of timely completion of the required work.
One of the interviewees commented that special consid-
eration should be given to preparation of the delivery schedule
when the needed item utilizes raw materials or components
requiring extended acquisition lead time. He stated that
his organization had discussed this concept, but had not
implemented it as a formal program. Special checks on known
long lead time items and random checks on suspected items
would allow a more realistic development of required delivery
dates. This would reduce the levels of delinquent contracts.
This extra effort requires increased usage of manpower resources,
and may not be feasible for organizational implementation at
all commands.
One individual suggested that greater Government involve-
ment in the contractor make-buy decision could serve to
reduce the long-term incidence of delinquency. By specify-
ing that the contractor manufacture or subcontract for
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certain items, the Government could aid in speeding the
availability of those components. For items with long
subcontract lead times, the contractor may be able to
manufacture the items with his in-house capabilities in
a more timely manner. Conversely, for items normally
manufactured in-house, some components may be available
in a more timely manner by subcontracting. This concept
has been discussed by the individual's organization, but
has not been actively implemented because it generally
requires a high level of initial investment to develop
a new in-house capability. Applied on a selective basis,
the concept could reduce delinquency levels on particular
contracts.
The actions discussed above may occur prior to award of
the contract and are preventive in nature. Other actions
may occur after award of the contract which are remedial
in nature in that they become operative after an indication
is received from the production progress that a delinquency
is imminent or has already occurred. Once the delinquency
has actually occurred, any action taken serves only to
reduce the length or impact of the delinquency.
Two of the individuals interviewed indicated that
production surveillance by industrial specialists at the
contractor's plant is an effective means of early identifi-
cation of potentially delinquent situations. Once that
potential is identified, efforts can be made to rectify the
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situation "before an actual delinquency occurs. This on-going
observation of the contractor's production efforts allows
real-time feedback to Government organizations of the
status of a contract. Progress on the contract may be
monitored and charted using PERT, Gantt, line of balance,
milestone and other techniques.
One individual suggested that Government use of
liquidated damages serves as a powerful motivator for
the contractor to complete the contract as quickly as
possible. This serves to reduce the extent and impact of
the delinquency, and may serve to decrease future delinquen-
cies from the same contractor.
One individual mentioned that open and free communica-
tion during contract performance can serve to reduce the
incidence or impact of delinquencies. Problems, suggestions
and possible solutions can be fully explored and discussed.
This will help to assure timely completion of required work
under the contract.
One individual mentioned that in certain situations,
the provisions of the Defense Materials System and the
Defense Priorities System (DMS/DPS) can be applied to speed
the availability of materials and increase production
priorities of critical items. If the application of the
provisions is effective, the incidence of delinquency can
be reduced. This individual cautioned, however, that,
"There are no teeth in the DMS/DPS program. " Although the
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Commerce Department has enforcement responsibility, he felt
that they provided inadequate enforcement of program pro-
visions. He stated that the flow-down provisions, whereby
subcontracts receive the same rating as the original
program, are often ignored by subcontractors or not placed
in subcontract provisions. He also stated that small
businesses often have problems applying the priority
provisions to larger vendors, suppliers or subcontractors.
If these weaknesses are pervasive throughout the acquisi-
tion system, it appears to the researcher that the value
of the DMS/DPS systems are only effective in the perceived
threat of possible action rather than real action or imposed
sanctions for failure to comply with program provisions.
One of the interviewees stated that the use of the
cure notice, show cause notice, and forebearance prior to
termination for default can often be effective in reducing
the length or impact of a delinquent contract. These actions
tend to increase the pressure on the contractor to perform
the contract rather than face the possibility of termina-
tion under default conditions. The researcher notes,
however, that as discussed in Questions 14 through 16, the
contractor's perceived probability of actual termination
for default is very remote. If this is the case, the
motivational value of the cure notice, show cause notice
and forebearance might be seriously questioned.
One of the individuals stated that the use of a specially
assigned expediter from the cognizant DCAS office can often
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"be effective. The expediter is responsible for ensuring
timely actions are taken at whatever levels are necessary
to assure timely completion of the contract. This does,
however, incur a higher than normal manpower usage. As
such, assignment of a special expediter should be limited
to cases of a critical nature.
One individual stated that his organization utilizes
escalating letters of concern to motivate contractors to
reduce the duration or impact of delinquencies. As a
contract appears to be in danger of becoming delinquent,
or actually becomes delinquent, letters of concern are
written to the contractor from successively higher levels
of command within the procuring agency. Usually the con-
tracting officer writes the first letter. The demonstrated
higher level of procuring agency interest shown by the
escalating letters of concern may motivate the contractor
to remedy the potential or actual delinquency in a timely
manner.
One of the interviewees stated that in cases where a
technical problem is causing the contractor to be in a
delinquent situation, or in a potentially delinquent
situation, technical assistance by the Government may be
offered to the contractor to aid in solving the problem.
This aid could reduce the probability, duration or impact
of a delinquency. A potential danger in this action is
that such aid may give a particular contractor a competitive
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advantage for future acquisitions. It may also tend to
make the contractor more dependent on the Government to
solve his technical problems. Although the Government
is not in the "business of solving contractor technical
problems, judicious use of this technique may be in the
best interest of the Government.
Expediting requested or suggested waivers and deviations
was mentioned by one of the individuals interviewed as a
means of reducing the duration or impact of a delinquency.
He stated that by reducing the amount of time involved
in processing paperwork and obtaining approval of changes
in the contract requirements, the final completion of the
contract may occur in a more timely manner. It appears to
the researcher that the timely processing of any required
or requested action during the contract performance will
speed its completion.
One of the individuals stated that where materials or
component parts are difficult for the contractor to obtain
in a timely manner, Government assistance in obtaining
those items would reduce the probability of a delinquency.
The researcher feels that the same cautions and potential
dangers described under the technical assistance response
above also apply to assistance in obtaining parts, com-
ponents and materials
.
The final response to the question of controls of
delinquencies was that there exists no legitimate method of
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effectively reducing or controlling delinquencies. His
contention was that no matter what action the Government
takes to reduce or eliminate delinquencies, the motivations
of the contractor will not change significantly, therefore
the incidence of delinquencies will not change in any
significant manner. The researcher feels that this shows
a very pessimistic outlook on the process of acquisition.
Several of these recommended control procedures were
mentioned in the literature base. Effective pre-award
survey and conference, open communication, cure notice,
show cause notice, forebearance, liquidated damages and
production surveillance were discussed in the available
literature. There was no significant difference between
the responses of the headquarters and the buying organiza-
tions. There was also very little agreement on ways to
control or reduce the incidence of delinquency. The
researcher infers from this that no one action is especially
effective in reducing delinquencies in a broad variety of
contracts. Many individual and situational factors affect
which action is felt to be effective.
All of the individuals interviewed agreed that the effect
of these controls on reducing the incidence of delinquency
is unknown. The complexity of interaction between Govern-
ment and contractor during the life of the contract and
the interplay of requests, actions and reactions make it
extremely difficult to assess the impact of a single action
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on the outcome of the contract. The situational and
individual factors involved in selecting and implementing
one or more of the controls in any given case makes com-
parison with other cases very difficult.
All of the interviewees stated that these controls are
used "because they are authorized in the DAR and other
organizational regulations and directives. The very
regimented legal and regulatory framework provides the
available actions. A typical comment was that these actions
were "in the DAR checklist," not referring to a physical
checklist, hut to the fact that they are contained in the
applicable regulations and procedures.
All of the individuals also stated that these actions
are taken "by the contracting officer or his officially
authorized designee, such as the contract administrator.
These are the only persons authorized by the DAR to take
such action.
Question 21 - Are any different procedures desired or
needed? If so, what are they?
This question was designed to probe for recommendations
to improve or modify the existing methods of controlling
or reducing the incidence of delinquencies. As in the
preceding discussion of control actions, the recom-
mended changes in procedures can logically be divided between
the pre-award and post-award phases of the contract. Some
recommendations are general in nature and apply to the
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overall acquisition process. The discussion of recommended
changes will "be presented in the order of pre-award, post-
award and general recommendations.
Recommended procedures effecting the pre-award phase
of the contract include four items. First, increase the
emphasis on and use of past performance in selecting
contractors for award of the contract. Poor performance
in past contracts may "be used as an indicator of future
performance. This judgment should be considered in light
of any special circumstances that affected past contracts
and any action taken "by the contractor to improve his
methods of operation and thus eliminate the deficiency causing
the delinquency.
Second, the use of more realistic RDD dates in the
solicitation documents can serve to decrease the incidence
of schedule buy- in by the contractor and reduce the incidence
of delinquency. Adequate recognition of current lead times
for materials and components will aid in determining rea-
sonable and realistic RDD's. The increase in organizational
workload to determine these leadtimes may be partially,
or perhaps totally, offset by a decrease in workload caused
by a decrease in delinquencies. This balancing effect would
not take place immediately, but would be felt over a period
of time.
Third, increasingly question the Small Business Admin-
istration (SBA) decisions to issue Certificates of Competency
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to small businesses who seriously lack the ability to per-
form the contractual requirements in a timely manner.
This suggestion is similar to the idea of utilizing ability
to perform the contract requirements in a timely fashion
as a key indicator of responsibility.
Fourth, increase the use of the DMS/DPS priorities
where appropriate and attempt to get more aggressive
enforcement of their provisions. The assignment of high
DMS/DPS priorities to time-sensitive requirements should
increase the level of management attention on the timely
completion of the project. To make the systems even more
effective, the provisions need a greater level of enforcement
Six recommendations were offered which effect the post-
award phase of the contract. First, emphasis should be
placed on taking needed corrective action during perfor-
mance of the contract rather than after it has become
delinquent. Corrective action effectively taken during
the performance of the contract may avert a delinquency,
but action taken after the delinquency has occurred can only
reduce the duration or impact of the delinquency.
The second suggestion is necessary to adequately carry
out the first. Better real-time reporting of aberrations
from expected contract performance is necessary for effec-
tive action to be taken in a timely manner. The sooner
the Government knows of a situation with the potential for
causing a delinquency, the sooner it can take action to




Third, "better or more timely processing of required
paperwork will eliminate any production delays caused by
paperwork delays . Expeditious consideration and action
requested or required for contract completion will reduce
the number of potential delays which could cause a contract
to move into a delinquent status.
Fourth, the contractor should be required to notify
the Government at the earliest moment that a contract is
likely to become delinquent. Regardless of production
surveillance activities of the Government, the contractor
is in the best position to determine the actual progress
of a contract and project its probable completion date.
If a contract is projected to become delinquent, the con-
tractor should notify the Government at that point so that
any required corrective action can be taken to avert a
delinquency.
Fifth, once the contract has moved into a delinquent
status, the adjustment in consideration should be of suf-
ficient size to motivate the contractor to reduce future
delinquencies. As discussed previously, the consideration
demanded for a change in the delivery schedule has been
generally ineffective in reducing delinquencies. Stated
one individual, "If the Government demanded enough con-
sideration to make it hurt, delinquencies would be reduced."
The sixth suggestion has actually been implemented by
one of the organizations interviewed. When a contract
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becomes delinquent, instead of having the contracting
officer make a positive determination to terminate the
contract, require him to make a positive determination
not to terminate for default. The former determination
tends to assume the Government will not terminate, and
the contracting officer must make the determination to
terminate. The latter determination takes a more aggessive
stance in that it assumes that the Government will terminate
a contract for default unless the contracting officer
determines not to initiate termination proceedings.
Three suggestions of a general nature were made. The
first was that for the level of delinquencies to be reduced,
the attention of Government acquisition personnel must be
focused on the problem. People will naturally focus their
attention on what they perceive to be organizational goals
as well as the interests of their supervisors. Expressed
management interest in the delinquency problem will serve
to activate increased interest in and attention to the
problem and cause a reduction in the incidence of delinquecy,
The second suggestion was that currently available
programs, such as the DMS/DPS, be more strongly enforced
and applied. The mere existence of a program has little
of the desired effect without aggressive enforcement and
application of its provisions.
Third, the efforts of Government acquisition personnel
should be concentrated on problem contractors. Those
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contractors who consistently perform their contracts
within the required parameters should "be allowed to con-
tinue to do so without Government surveillance and involve-
ment. Conversely, those pro Diem contractors who continually
fail to meet delivery and performance requirements should
receive the in-depth attention of the Government.
The changes proposed "by the individuals interviewed are
multi-faceted in nature. The researcher feels that maximum
efforts should "be made to effectively utilize the existing
programs "before new ones are developed. Increased atten-
tion on past performance as a predictor of future perfor-
mance can "be used to identify those contractors needing
intensive scrutiny on current contract performance. Corrective
actions during contract performance are more effective in
reducing delinquencies than are actions after the delinquency
has occurred. To accomplish this, near real-time information
is needed from the contract administration organizations.
Increased interest and attention of all personnel in Govern-
ment acquisition organizations is essential to any effective
effort to reduce the incidence and impact of delinquent
contracts.
Question 22 - What procedures, outside of the established
ones, are used to control or reduce delinquent deliveries,
in "both pre-award and post-award phases of the contract?
Question 23 - How well do they work?
Question 24 - Why are they used?
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Question 25 - Who is involved with them, and to what
extent?
Questions 22 through 25 were asked in an effort to
identify other than established procedures used "by Government
acquisition personnel to reduce the incidence of delinquency.
No responses were obtained for currently utilized actions
within this classification. It seems to the researcher
that there are two possible reasons for the lack of response.
The first reason is that the interviewees knew of no
unauthorized procedures "being currently used. The second
reason is that they did not wish to disclose any such
activities. The researcher feels that "because of the con-
fidentiality of the interviews and the willing cooperation
in fully answering all other questions, the first reason
is most likely. On the whole, Government acquisition
personnel use only those control procedures established
in the DAR and applicable organizational directives.
I. SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE
Question 26 - What internal control or tracking pro-
cedures are used to monitor schedule performance?
Question 27 - How effective are they?
Question 28 - Who monitors them?
The purpose of Questions 26, 27 and 28 was to determine
what, if any, organizational activities are being performed
to track the status of contractor performance on a contract.
The initiation of effective corrective action to remove a
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potential delinquency-causing situation during completion
of the contract is predicated on timely knowledge of the
status of contract performance and progress. Only two of
the organizations interviewed described actions taken to
gain such knowledge. TARCOM stated that monthly telephonic
inquiries are made to obtain current status of contract
progress on critical items. DCAS uses contractor progress
reports to monitor the status of progress on contracts.
Unless supported "by direct observation and reports by
industrial specialists in the contractor's facilities, both
of these tracking methods rely on information generated and
reported by the contractor. The accuracy and timeliness of
the reported information is entirely dependent on the
contractor.
The other organizations stated that their control or
tracking procedures consisted of information obtained from
the various management information systems identified in
Chapter Two as CCSS, AMIS and SAMMS. For example, the SAMMS
system provides the F-38 report, or Current Delinquencies
by CLIN, and the F-39 report, or CLINS due for Delivery.
These and other management information system reports are
used by the Government in tracking the status of contract
performance . These reports are summary in nature and tend
to report problems well after they have occurred.
With the exception of TARCOM, all organizations felt
that the effectiveness of their tracking systems in reducing
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the incidence of delinquencies has "been low. The reporting
systems do not allow near real-time action to "be taken in
order to reduce delinquencies. TARCOM applies management
by exception to contractors having problems keeping up with
schedule requirements. They feel that this method is
somewhat effective in reducing delinquencies.
Three sources of monitoring activity are involved in
tracking contract progress. DCAS, thei major subordinate
commands of DARCOM and the post-award divisions of the DLA
procurement centers monitor contract progress through the
various methods described above.
The effectiveness of the monitoring and control activ-
ities of procurement organizations has not been discussed
in the available literature base. The researcher feels
that the only way to provide truly effective tracking and
control procedures is to perform on-line observation at the
contractor's facilities. The information provided by the
management information systems is not timely enough to pro-
vide for action on the contract prior to delinquency.
Information provided by the contractor through written
or telephonic reports may be suspect as to accuracy and
timeliness. The contractor will wish to portray his





Question 29 - What do you perceive to "be the contractual
or extra- contractual incentives to meet scheduled deliveries
in a competitive environment?
Question 30 - In a sole source environment?
These two questions were posed to explore the difference
in incentives to meet schedule requirements for competitive
and sole source environments. The responses indicated no
difference in types of incentives between the two business
environments. As such, the response data will be presented
together. The responses were as follows:
Contractual Incentives Responses
loss of income 3
positive contractual incentives 3





nebulous patriotic feeling 3
less Government involvement 2
professional pride 1
One incentive inherent in the contract was mentioned by
three of the individuals interviewed. That is the loss of
income due to a decreased level of payment for the items
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delivered. The decrease in payment may "be caused "by a
change in consideration in the form of lower cost to the
Government for a change in the delivery schedule. It may
also be caused by the deduction of liquidated damages from
the contract price. Since profit is the primary motivator
of contractor activity, a threat of reduction in profit
becomes a primary incentive to perform within the delivery
schedule.
Three of the individuals interviewed mentioned the
broader term of positive contractual incentives, which
includes profit and special incentive fees for meeting or
exceeding specified schedule requirements. It may also
include progress payments when such payments are tied to
completion of parts or all of the specified work by given
dates or within given periods of time.
These same three individuals also mentioned the broad
term of negative contractual incentives. This includes
decrease in total payment by adjustment in consideration for
a change in the delivery schedule, the deduction of liquidated
damages from contract price, delay of progress payments when
tied to the delivery schedule and avoidance of termination
of the contract for default. The adjustment in consideration
may directly or indirectly affect profit on the contract.
A direct effect on profit would be a reduction in contract
payment; an indirect effect would be an increase in the
amount of service or product delivered.
92

One individual mentioned schedule incentives specifically
as a motivator for the contractor to meet delivery schedules.
Depending on the provisions of the incentive arrangement,
the incentive may "be positive or negative. Variations of
the incentive arrangement may provide for an increase in
price for exceeding or meeting delivery schedule or for a
decrease for failure to meet the schedule. These arrange-
ments are tied directly to the primary motivator of profit.
One individual suggested the use of performance bonding as
an incentive to contractors to meet delivery schedules.
Although generally used in construction projects, per-
formance "bonds could be adapted to production contracts
to provide an additional incentive to complete contract
requirements by the required dates
.
The most-mentioned extra-contractual incentive was
corporate pride and prestige. This was mentioned by four
of the interviewees. Employee pride in the corporation
and prestige among other corporations may derive from the
ability of the firm to fully meet its commitments. Lack
of delinquent contracts contributes to the pride or prestige
of the corporation.
Three of the individuals interviewed indicated that a
nebulous patriotic feeling toward completing Government
contracts in a satisfactory manner acts as an incentive to
reduce late deliveries. The feeling that a firm should
support the Government by providing its best service may
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lead to a reduction in the level of delinquencies. This
could occur when the patriotic feeling causes the firm to
direct more management attention to the Government contract.
Two of the individuals interviewed stated that an incen-
tive for a contractor to perform the required work on time
is that of less Government involvement. When the contractor
performs adequately, the Government does less monitoring
of production activities. Many firms do not like to have
Government acquisition personnel involved in their "business
operation. In order to avoid this involvement, which may
he considered disruptive, the contractor may "be motivated
to complete all of his Government contracts in compliance
with the requirements.
One of the individuals interviewed mentioned professional
pride as an incentive to delinquency avoidance. This is
differentiated from corporate pride in that professional
pride is the personal feeling of an individual manager in
his ability to accomplish his assigned tasks in a timely
and complete manner. The individual efforts of the manage-
ment personnel may lead to a reduction in the incidence of
delinquency.
The researcher feels that contractual incentives are
far stronger than extra-contractual incentives. The profit
motive is directly tied to contractual incentives. When
dollar payments and profit levels offered under the contract
are threatened, the feelings of pride, prestige and patriotism
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can easily "become subordinated to the dollar. The effects
of negative incentives reduce the level of profit on a given
contract, while positive incentive provisions can increase
profit. During the interviews, three of the individuals
stated that less than one percent of all contracts contain
positive incentives other than contract price; at the same
time, all contracts contain negative incentives. Except for
controlling costs, there seem to "be few provisions for
increasing profit and many provisions for reducing profit.
The researcher believes that an increased use of positive
contractual incentive provisions will have a greater affect
on reducing delinquency than the use of negative provisions.
Question 31 - How effective are the incentives?
The existence of various incentives is of little value
unless they are effective. The responses were as follows:
Effectiveness Responses
not effective 9
extra-contractual incentives not effective 8
incentives more effective in competitive
environment 3
Nine of the individuals interviewed stated that none
of the available incentives are effective in reducing the
incidence of delinquency. These individuals felt that
the negative incentives, such as termination for default,
change in consideration and liquidated damages, have not
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"been strenuously applied, or have not "been applied with
sufficient magnitude, to be effective in reducing delinquent
delivery.
Eight of the individuals interviewed stated that the
contractual incentives are slightly effective, and the
extra-contractual incentives have no effect at all on
reducing delinquencies. They felt that the profit motive
was sufficiently, overriding as to eliminate the effects of
extra-contractual incentives. Extra-contractual motivations
can easily "be subordinated by the profit motive directly
tied to contract provisions. Three of the individuals
stated that they perceived any of the operative incentives
to be somewhat more effective in the competitive environment
than in a sole source environment. In a competitive environ-
ment, several firms vie for the contract and the opportunity
to make a profit. The profit incentive becomes more effec-
tive since adequate profit allows the firm to continue in
the marketplace.
The available literature base did not discuss or evaluate
the effectiveness of contractual or extra-contractual incen-
tives in either the competitive or sole source environments.
The researcher feels that the profit motive is the over-
riding motivation for the contractor to perform. If this
motivation is to be effectively stimulated, the proper
mix of positive and negative incentive provisions must be
used. Where timely delivery is an important element of an
acquisition, a positive incentive provision should be
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included in the contract. Corresponding negative pro-
visions should also "be included for the failure to perform
the requirements in a timely manner. The more critical
the dimension of time, the greater should "be the magnitude
of the incentive provisions.
K. DELIVERY SCHEDULES
Question 32 - How do you check the plan for meeting
delivery schedules when letting a contract?
All of the individuals interviewed stated that the
contractor's plan for meeting a delivery schedule is checked
by the pre-award survey team. The survey team, if requested,
examines the contractor's plans and determines whether they
are consonant with the capabilities, capacity and facili-
ties. For an item routinely manufactured by the contractor,
such as commercial items, no specific plan may be necessary.
The manufacturing plan is known and capacity may be the only
question in the contractor's ability to deliver the items
on time. For non-routinely manufactured items, the com-
plexity of the plan may cover a wide range from short and
simple to voluminous and complex. The adequacy of the plan
is estimated by the pre-award survey team.
The researcher feels that for most contracts, the pre-
award survey should provide adequate assessment of the
contractor's plan for timely completion. Where time is a
critical factor in the acquisition, the procuring office
may wish to participate in the survey or require the
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contractor to submit the details of his plan prior to award
of the contract. Because of the extra manpower necessary
to accomplish this, the selection of contracts to which to
apply these procedures should be made in a judicious manner.
Question 33 - How does the prime or subcontractor
establish a plan for meeting delivery schedules?
All of the individuals interviewed agreed that there is
no given method of establishing a plan for meeting delivery
schedules. The level of effort placed into planning for
schedule requirements is dependent on the complexity and
novelty of the acquisition. A routinely manufactured or
simple item requires little formal planning. Complex or
novel items require extensive planning by many of the
firm's specialists. The level of detail in the planning
effort is dependent on the complexity of the item and the
magnitude of the acquisition in terms of dollar amounts and
percentage of the firm's total business.
General methods of planning and scheduling have been
presented in the current literature. The researcher feels
that the method of establishing a plan for timely contractor
completion of the requirements is not as important as the
existence and completeness of the plan.
Question 3k - How do you establish the required delivery
dates?
All individuals interviewed stated that the customer
established the required delivery dates. Since the pro-
curement organization exists to serve the needs of the
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customer, it must attempt to acquire the desired items
within the times specified "by the using organization
.
Failure to do so results in a failure by the procuring
organization to provide complete support to its customers.
L. FUTURE TRENDS IN CONTROLLING DELIVERY DELINQUENCIES
Question 35 - What do you anticipate the future trend
to be in delinquent deliveries? Why?
The purpose of this and the following question was to
attempt to identify common expectations of what is anticipated
to occur in the future for delinquencies and actions taken
to reduce delinquencies. The responses were divided "between
no change and slight improvement. The data is presented
by individual and by organization in order to reduce any
bias created by an uneven number of individuals per organiza-
tion. There were no major differences in responses between
headquarters and buying command personnel. The response
data is presented below.
Trend Organizations Individuals
no change 5 9
some improvement 2 8
Nine of the individuals interviewed stated that they
anticipated no change in the overall level of delinquencies.
They felt that the basic reasons for the delinquencies would
continue to be operative. They also perceived that no major
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change or improvement in available controls will be forth-
coming. With no reduction in the incidence of causes and
no improvement in controls, the likelihood of a reduction
in delinquency levels was deemed remote.
Eight of the individuals expressed the opinion that the
levels of delinquency will decrease slightly due to an
increased level of management interest. As management
personnel express a greater interest in reduction of delin-
quency levels, the focus of attention of their subordinates
in the acquisition organizations will be shifted more toward
reducing delinquency levels. They did not foresee major
changes in the causes or controls of delinquencies, merely
an increase in management attention.
The researcher feels that the latter is more likely to
occur. As the true impact of the delinquency problem becomes
more fully realized, the intensity of management interest
will increase. When this interest is communicated to the
subordinates, their desire to appear responsive to manage-
ment desires will lead them to attempt to eliminate or
reduce delinquency-causing situations. Success in these -
efforts will reduce the level of delinquencies.
Question 36 - What do you anticipate the future trend
*
to be in control procedures?
The purpose of this question has been previously des-
cribed. No major differences between responses of head-





no change 4 10
some improvement 3 7
Ten of the seventeen individuals interviewed felt that
no. changes in the types of control procedures available
or the use of the current procedures would be forthcoming.
They felt that other acquisition problems held higher
priorities than delinquent deliveries, and therefore no
corrective action would be likely in the near future.
Seven of the individuals stated that they anticipated
some improvement in the use of current control procedures.
They commented that although they did not feel that new
controls would be established, the existing ones would
be more effectively utilized. They felt that increased
management interest would lead directly to a more inten-
sive utilization of available remedies or controls.
The researcher feels that the latter will be the case.
Many control procedures are available within the Government
acquisition system; these were discussed in this and
previous chapters. This research has indicated that several
of the available controls are not perceived to be used
effectively. If the effectiveness of the utilization of
these available controls is increased, new or changed con-




This Chapter has presented the data obtained during the
interview sessions and has provided an analysis of that
data. The perceptions of acquisition personnel as to the
extent and impact of the delinquency problem were examined.
The causes of late deliveries were identified by the various
sources of those causes. Contract types, equipment classi-
fications and sizes of contractors exhibiting particular
delinquency problems were examined. Predictive signals
of delinquencies were identified and discussed. The con-
siderations involved in approving or disallowing schedule
changes were explored. The use of termination for default
in the case of late deliveries was examined as well as
other control procedures used to reduce the incidence of
delinquency. Schedule control and tracking procedures were
examined. An evaluation of the contractual and extra-con-
tractual incentives to perform in a timely manner was
presented followed by a discussion of evaluation procedures
for delivery plans. Finally, a presentation of perception
of future trends in the areas of delinquency levels and
available control procedures was made.
Chapter Four will present the conclusions and recom-
mendations of the researcher based on the data and analysis
presented in this Chapter.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This research has allowed the researcher to make
several conclusions and recommendations.
1. Conclusion - The delinquency pro Diem is serious and
deserving of increased attention within the Government
acquisition community. Between fifteen and thirty percent
of all contract line items are not delivered in a timely
manner. Across DoD, the dollar value of the delinquent
items is estimated at several "billion dollars. These
findings and support for this conclusion were discussed
in Section C of Chapter II.
Recommendation - The size and seriousness of the delin-
quency problem should be publicized to all levels of the
various acquisition agencies. Estimated data for DoD and
specific information for the particular organization should
be disseminated to both management personnel and subordinates
within the headquarters and buying organizations. The atten-
tion of these acquisition personnel will be focused on issues
of command interest and those for which specific informa-
tion exists. If attention is not focused on the delinquency
problems, the status quo will prevail. Command Information
programs and posters can be used to disseminate the infor-




2. Conclusion - The- majority of causes of delinquency
is management oriented. The findings presented and discussed
in Question 5 lend support to this conclusion. For "both
Government and contractor- caused delinquencies, the failure
"by management to provide complete and current information,
make timely decisions, provide adequate and realistic plan-
ning and properly follow-up on the implementation of plans
have been shown to be primary causes of delinquency.
Recommendation - Government acquisition organizations
should take positive steps to increase the effectiveness
and efficiency of management. They should also encourage
contractors to take these same actions. A careful review of
programs should be made in such areas as selecting realistic
RDD's, updating technical data packages, assuring timely
provision of Government furnished materials, equipment and
tooling and processing required paperwork in a timely manner.
The Government should also make a more careful review of
contractor management capabilities during the pre-award
survey. Improving management of contracts should decrease
the incidence of delinquency.
3. Conclusion - More emphasis is placed on reducing
delinquencies after the delinquency has occurred than "before
award or during contract performance. Question 17, which
discusses the available control procedures for delinquencies,
provided six different responses for pre-award actions and
eleven different responses for post-award actions. Nearly
twice the number of pre-award actions are available for use
after the award of the contract.
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Recommendation - The major acquisition commands should '
place greater emphasis on taking action to reduce delinquen-
cies "before and during contract award and performance. Action
taken after the delinquency has occurred can serve only to
reduce the impact and duration of the delinquency. Command
emphasis on action prior to delinquency rather than reaction
after its occurrence could reduce delinquency. Responses to
Question 21 tend to support this recommendation and provide
some specific actions which should "be taken. Command
emphasis on timely application of available control proce-
dures will translate into appropriately increased attention
by acquisition personnel. This should lead to a decrease
in the incidence of delinquency.
4. Conclusion - The pre-award survey is the most
frequently used item of information in predicting the
probability of a delinquency. As indicated in the dis-
cussion of the responses to Question 9» over one-third
of the individuals interviewed utilized the information
provided in the pre-award survey as a predictive device
in assessing the probability of a delinquency.
Recommendation - The major acquisition organizations should
improve and increase the utilization of the pre-award survey
information in detecting probable delinquencies. If
detected early, timely action can be taken to reduce the
probability that delivery of the required items will be
late. By increasing the number of times that a pre-award
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survey team is requested specifically to examine and
evaluate the possibility of delinquency, an acquisition
agency should "be able to detect and correct early signs of
possible delinquency in a greater portion of contracts.
When this happens, the level of delinquency will decrease.
5. Conclusion - The use of past performance on contract
completion is a very important indicator of probable future
performance by a contractor. As indicated by the response
data to Question 9 twenty-two percent of the responses
indicated that past performance is used as a predictive
device for possible delinquencies. When past performance
indicators are combined with pre- award survey information
acquisition personnel should have a very good indicator of
probable performance on the contract.
Recommendation - The major acquisition organizations
should stress an increased use of past performance as a
determinant of source selection where timely delivery of
the items is a critical factor in the acquisition. Early
identification of potential problems can allow intensive
management effort to be focused on solving the problem
and reducing the probability of a delinquency.
6. Conclusion - Available incentive provisions, both
positive and negative, contractual and extra- contractual,
are not effective in reducing the incidence of delinquency.
Moreover, those incentives which are available are not being
effectively utilized. The responses to Question 31 indicate
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that incentives to reduce delinquencies are of limited
effectiveness. Three of the individuals responding to
Question 30 indicated a lack of use of positive incentive
provisions; further, the responses to Questions 14
through 16 provide an example of non-effective use of
termination for default, one of the control procedures.
Recommendation - Acquisition agencies should encourage
greater use of positive incentive provisions and more
strenuous application of negative incentive provisions. In
order to better motivate contractors to deliver the speci-
fied goods in a timely manner, the incentives, "both positive
and negative, must be effective. Incentive provisions
which are effectively employed will motivate the contractor
to strive toward timely completion of the contract and to
avoid delinquency situations.
7. Conclusion - There is a sense of futility and
fatalism about the delinquency problem among the Government
acquisition community. The lack of timely information
flow between procurement, administration and contractor
personnel, the prescriptive nature of the DAR, and lack
of effectiveness of the remedial alternatives provided
by the DAR contribute to the feeling that little can be
done, or will be done, to reduce or eliminate the delinquency
problem. The responses to Question 18 indicate that the
perceived value of current controls is small. The responses
to Questions 35 and 36 indicate that no significant changes
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in the extent of the problem or the available controls
over the problem are anticipated. These expectations
have led to an attitude of resignation.
Recommendation - A modification of these attitudes will
require acquisition management personnel to aggressively
support both proactive and retroactive control procedures.
This support will slowly change the current attitudes, but
the change will be slow and may ocqur over a long period
of time. Positive attitudes about the ability to reduce
the delinquency problem may lead to an actual reduction in
the level of delinquency.
8. Conclusion - Development of a decision-assisting
model for the delinquency problem is not feasible at this
time. A multiplicity of causes, controls, considerations,
predictive devices and tracking procedures were identified
by this research. The number of combinations of cir-
cumstances make the development of a manual model extremely
difficult at this stage of the research.
Recommendation - For a meaningful decision-assisting model
to be developed, an intensive study of the decision process
should be made. The complexity of the variables will
probably require application of data processing techniques.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
There are many aspects of the delinquency problem in
need of further study. Some suggested areas are as follows:
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1. Is contract administration cost-effective and what
are possible alternatives?
2. What is the extent of schedule buy- in by contractors
and what methods can be instituted to more accurately
identify and utilize current lead times for materials and
components?
3. What is the true effectiveness of contractual and
extra-contractual incentives in reducing delinquency?
4. What methods can be utilized to increase the
effectiveness and use of the pre-award survey?
5. What is the current condition of the Government's
technical data packages and how can they be updated?
6. What are the total costs to the Government of
delinquent deliveries?
7. Are the current Defense Materials and Priorities
Systems effective and what changes might be recommended?
8. Are the current arrangements of authority and
responsibility for certificates of competency effective,
and if not, what changes might be made?
9. Can a computer-model be created to aid decision-
making in delinquency situations?
C. CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY
This study has provided a base for further research
into the problem of delinquent deliveries of items under
contract. Significantly greater amounts of in-depth research
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need to be made into the various aspects of delinquency.
Additionally, greater amounts of attention need to "be
placed on the delinquency problem. This study has pro-
vided a comprehensive look at the extent, impacts, causes
and remedies involved in the problem of delinquent deliveries
A heightened awareness of the various aspects of delinquency
will aid management in formulating and applying effective





1. What is the estimated extent, in "both percentage and
dollar terms, of delinquent deliveries of goods in
DoD production contracts?
2. What is your goal or standard for delinquent deliveries
(in percentage or dollar terms)?
3
.
How was this goal or standard established?
4. What do you perceive to "be the impact of delinquent
deliveries to government, prime contractors and sub-
contractors?
5. What are the causes of delinquent deliveries, in both
general and specific terms, within the classifications
of government caused, contractor caused, and other?
(in order of importance)
6. Is there any particular contract type that has been
experiencing delinquency problems?
7. Is there any specific type or classification of equip-
ment that has been experiencing delinquency problems?
8. Is there any specific class of contractor, large,
medium, small, minority, etc., that has been experiencing
delinquency problems?
9. What methods are used, or signals looked for, to pre-
dict or evaluate the possibility of delinquent deliveries?
10. When it becomes apparent that the required delivery will
not be made on schedule, what considerations are given
to allowing the schedule to change as opposed to ter-
minating the contract? Why?
11. Same question as above, but to disallowing a schedule
change? Why?
12. If a schedule change is allowed, what damages are




13. How and when are they determined?
14. In delinquency situations, how often has termination
for default "been seriously considered?
15. How often was it actually used?
16. When termination for default was considered and
rejected, why was it rejected?
17. What are the established procedures to control or
reduce delinquent deliveries, in "both pre-award and post-
award phases of the contract?
18. How well do they work?
19. Why are they used?
20. Who is involved with them, and to what extent?
21. Are different procedures desired or needed? If so,
what are they?
22. What procedures, outside of the established ones, are
used to control or reduce delinquent deliveries, in
both pre-award and post-award phases of the contract?
23
.
How well do they work?
24. Why are they used?
25. Who is involved with them, and to what extent?
26. What internal control or tracking procedures are used
to monitor schedule performance?
27. How effective are they?
28. Who monitors them?
29. What do you perceive to be the contractual or extra-
contractual incentives to meet scheduled deliveries
in a competitive environment?
30. In a sole source environment?
31. How effective are the incentives?
32. How do you check the plan for meeting delivery
schedules when letting a contract?
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33. How does the prime or subcontractor establish a plan
for meeting delivery schedules?
34. How do you establish required delivery dates?
35- What do you anticipate the future trend to be in
delinquent deliveries? Why?
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2. Broadaway, Thomas, COL, USA, Chief of Procurement
Directorate, ARRCOM, interview granted 18 January 1980.
3. Church, Philip S., Industrial Specialist, Production
Services Branch, Contracting Directorate, DLA, interview
granted 19 January 1980.
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9. Kosch, Charles A., CDR, SC , USN, Director of Contract
Management Division, Naval Material Command, interview
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10. Meyer, Gary L. , Chief of Heavy Weapons Branch, Procure-
ment Directorate, ARRCOM, interview granted 18 January
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11. Rattigan, John, Production Specialist, Procurement
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Action Branch, Procurement Directorate, ARRCOM,
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14. Voldrich, Joseph, Chief of Production Division,
Procurement and Production Directorate, TARCOM,
interview granted 17 January 1980.
15. Web"b, Everett C, CPT, USAF, Manufacturing Engineer,
Manufacturing Engineering Division, Directorate of
Manufacturing, AFSC, interview granted 16 January 1980.
16. Welch, Roland W. , Chief of Primary Support Division,
Procurement Directorate, ARRCOM, interview granted
18 January 1980.
17. Windle, A. L. , Industrial Specialist, Procurement and









Definitions, Abbreviations and Acronyms
Administrative Contracting Officer
Air Force Systems Command
U. S. Army Armament Material Readiness
Command
Contract line item numbers.
Contract Modification - (DAR 1-201.2) -
"any written alteration in specification,
delivery point, rate of delivery, con-
tract period. . . "
DAR - Defense Acquisition Regulations
DARCOM - U. S. Army Material Development and Readiness
Command
DCAS - Defense Contract Administration Services
DCASMA - Defense Contract Administration Services
Management Area
DCASR - Defense Contract Administration Services
Region
Delinquency - (DAR 25-101.3) -
"includes (i) actual failure by the contractor
that is, his failure, regardless of reason,
to meet the contract delivery or performance
schedule and (ii) potential failure by the
contractor - that is, his failure, regard-
less of reason, to maintain such progress
in contract performance as is required to













ECP - Engineering Change Proposal
Excusable Delay - (DAR 7-203.11) -
occurs if ". . . failure (to meet delivery
schedules) arises out of causes "beyond the
control and without the fault or negligence
of the Contractor. Such causes may include,
"but are not restricted to: acts of God or
the public enemy; acts of the Government
in either its sovereign or contractual
capacity; fires ; floods; epidemics;
quarrantine restrictions; strikes; freight
embargoes? and unusually severe weather;
but in every case the failure to perform
must be beyond the control and without
fault of the Contractor.
"
GFE/GFM/GFP- Government Furnished Equipment/Material/
Property
Government Delay of Work - (DAR 7-104. 77(f) (a) ) -
occurs when "... the performance of all or
any part of the work is delayed or interrupted
by an act of the Contracting Officer in the
administration of this contract, which act
is not expressly or impliedly authorized
by this contract, or by his failure to act
within the time specified in this contract
(or within a reasonable time if no time is
specified . . . ")
NAVMAT - Naval Material Command
PCO - Procuring Contracting Officer
Production Surveillance - (DAR 25-101.1) -
"... that part of Government contract
administration directed towards (i) deter-
mining the degree of progress made by the con-
tractor in meeting his delivery or perfor-
mance schedule and (ii) identifying factors
which may delay delivery or performance."
QA - Quality Assurance
RDD - Required Delivery Date
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